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Social movements have changed the social, political, and economic landscape of 
the world, and continue to affect societies everywhere. The power and influence of a 
particular movement is dependent on its ability to produce sufficient social disruption. The 
subsequent leverage enables challenging groups to initiate social change. Tactical choices 
are key in the production of social disruption.1 In essence, tactical choices are central issues 
contributing to the success-or failure-of social movements. The established power of 
dominant groups and their repressive actions create obstacles for challenging movements and 
their use of disruptive tactics. Thus, the art of devising and implementing tactics that can be 
effective when confronted with severe opposition is crucial to the movement’s development 
and outcome.2 This study will focus upon the Black Panther Party and the tactical choices 
which it selected in pursuit of social change. 
Purpose and Rationale 
The Black Panther Party emerged from the civil rights movement as a militant and 
aggressive movement organization. The Black Panther Party employed certain tactics that 
1 Doug McAdam, “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency,” American Sociological 
Review 48 (1983): 735-753. 
2 
Aldon Morris, “Centuries of Black Protest,” ed., Herbert Hill and James E. Jones, Race In 
America, (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1993), 23-24. 
1 
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not only produced social disruption but led to direct responses by the authorities.3 Three 
tactical choices made by the Black Panther Party will be analyzed for the purpose of this 
research. The tactical choices are: (1) the Party’s advocacy and use of armed self-defense; 
(2) the Party’s creation of survival programs; and (3) the Party’s formation of coalitions with 
other challenging groups. These tactics, initiated by the Black Panther Party, generated 
conflict with the authorities and brought the organization under repressive actions that 
probably no organization at the time had endured.4 Thus, the development and outcome of 
the Black Panther Party is considered to be a function of the three tactical choices mentioned 
above. 
The purpose of this study is the analysis of the role of tactical choices in the 
development and outcome of the Black Panther Party. The general questions to be answered 
are: How did the Black Panther Party utilize tactics such as armed self-defense, survival 
programs, and coalitions to offset the political power of the authorities? What were the 
responses of the authorities to such tactics? And, to what extent did the Black Panther Party’s 
choice of those tactics affect the development and outcome of the organization? It is argued 
here that the research of the above critical questions will contribute to our existing knowledge 
of social movements in general. 




The mid sixties marked a period during which various groups militantly 
challenged the legitimacy and authority of important institutions within the United States.5 
Urban rebellion swept across northern and western inner city communities. Colleges, with 
increased enrollment of blacks and other minority students, became centers of demands for 
community control. Prisoners such as Malcolm X, Eldridge Cleaver, and George Jackson 
emerged as voices of those incarcerated in American prisons and demanding their human 
rights. Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Native Americans and Asian Americans began 
to aggressively demand justice and change in their communities. The Women’s movement 
actively challenged oppressive conditions. Even European American students were 
challenging the Vietnam war and other principles of American society. 
In New York, Malcolm X left the Nation of Islam, and founded the Organization 
of African American Unity(OAAU). Malcolm X believed that blacks should focus their 
struggle upon self determination and human rights rather than civil rights and integration. He 
also advocated the use of arms in protecting the black community from attacks which 
attempted to impede the process of attaining human rights. Malcolm X, however, was 
assassinated in 1965 before his organization could begin to implement its programs.6 
The Student Non Violent Coordinating Committee(SNCC) was another 
organization functioning during this period. SNCC was a militant civil rights group which 
was formed by southern black students and organized in southern states. Known for its work 
5Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Making of America, (New York: Macmillian Publishing, 
Inc., 1984), chap. 11 passim. 
6Ibid.,278. 
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around voter registration, some of SNCC’s greatest accomplishments were grassroots 
programs it established in the rural areas of southern states. By 1964, SNCC began to shift 
its political perspective, replacing integration with self determination as the focus of its 
efforts. As political activities within the struggle for self determination shifted from the South 
to northern and western cities, SNCC was unprepared to assume a leadership role. SNCC 
was past its prime and did not appeal to the emerging militant youth in the northern and 
western urban areas.7 
In the midst of this period of massive social and political activism by the various 
disfranchised sectors in the country, the Black Panther Party emerged in 1966, as a militant 
and aggressive organization which advocated armed self defense and self determination. The 
Black Panther Party created a ten-point program which stated the following goals of the 
organization: 
1) We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black 
community. 
2) We want full employment for our people. 
3) We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black 
community. 
4) We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings. 
5) We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this 
decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true 
history and our role in the present-day society. 
6) We want all Black men to be exempt from military service. 
7 
Robert Allen, Black Awakening in Capitalist America, (Garden City, New York: Anchor 
Books, 1970), 268-280. 
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7) We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of 
Black people. 
8) We want freedom for all Black men in federal, state, county and city prisons 
and jails. 
9) We want all Black people when brought to trial to be tried in a court by a 
jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined 
by the Constitution of the United States. 
10) We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace * 
The Black Panther Party developed out of the legacy of slain human rights leader Malcolm 
X and the failure of other civil rights organizations to appeal to the more radical segments of 
the black community.9 Attracting urban youth and channeling the militant rage of the black 
community, the Black Panther Party grew from a tiny Oakland, California street group which 
organized around police brutality to an international organization10 with comprehensive 
survival programs. The Party served thousands of meals on a daily basis, as well as testing 
hundreds of thousands of people for disease. The Black Panther Party existed from 1966 to 
the mid-1970’s,u after which it no longer had a large impact upon the American scene. The 
period of study in this thesis covers the Party’s duration between 1966 and 1975. As stated 
above, this study will analyze the role of the three tactical choices made by the Black Panther 
Party in its development and outcome. 
^uey P. Newton, To Die For The People, (New York: Random House, 1972), 3-6. 
9 
Sanjukta Banerj, Black Power and Radicalism, (New York: Advent Books, Inc., 1987), 139. 
10Quarles, 278. 
1 'There have been some inconsistencies as to the exact year the Black Panther Party ceased to 
exist, but it is generally agreed upon in the literature that the Party’s demise may have occured during the 
mid-1970’s. 
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Theoretical Approaches to Social Movements 
and Conceptual Framework 
There has not been many sociological studies of the Black Panther Party. 
Sociological studies of other various movement organizations do not apply due to the time 
and uniqueness of the Black Panther Party. Therefore, the theoretical approaches to social 
movements are emphasized in this thesis instead of actual sociological studies of social 
movement organizations. 
The 1960’s and the social movements that emerged during that period had a huge 
effect upon sociology, more significantly the field of social movements.12 The major 
theoretical formulations of that time were: the collective behavior model, the mass society 
model, and the relative deprivation model. In response to criticisms of these various classical 
models in explaining modem social movements, a new approach emerged in the mid to late 
seventies, termed resource mobilization.13 The political process model, a variant of resource 
mobilization, shares the same fundamental elements with resource mobilization. Both focus 
upon the rationality of movement actors, the strategic problems confronted by social 
12 
J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and The Study of Social Movements,” 
Annual Review of Sociology 9 (1983): 528. 
13 
The more recent social movement literature, of the past ten years, has incorporated social 
psychological factors within the study of movements. The resource mobilization and political process 
paradigms have focused upon organization as the primary unit of analysis, while the social network of face-to- 
face encounters is the more typical unit of analysis for theorists analyzing social psychological factors. The 
emergence of social psychology in the field of social movements has evolved around three elements: a 
reconceptualization of the actor, the extension of the central role of micromobilzation in face-to-face 
interaction within a variety of group contexts, and the specification of meaning generating oppositional 
cultures at varying levels of temporal extensity, formality, and instrumental appropriation. For further study, 
see Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by Aldon D. Morris and Carol Mueller(1992). For the 
purpose of this study social psychological factors are not examined. Therefore, the more recent social 
movement literature has not been included into this study of the Black Panther Party’s tactical choices. 
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movements, and the role of movements as agencies for social change. However, the political 
process model expands upon areas concerning strategic factors, therefore providing a 
framework more fitting for this study. On the other hand, classical models such as collective 
behavior, mass society, and relative deprivation focus their attention upon structural 
breakdown and the perceived irrational individual participation that coincides with rapid social 
change.14 
Within the collective behavior model, theorists view social movements as a set 
of noninstitutionalized collective actions consciously oriented toward social change. Social 
movements are viewed as extensions of more elementary forms of collective behavior. The 
“social movement” serves as the unit of analysis.15 Turner and Killian, proponents of 
collective behavior, define a social movement as: 
Collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist change in the 
society or group of which it is a part. As a collectivity a movement is a group 
with indefinite and shifting membership and with leadership whose position is 
determined more by the informal response of the members than by formal 
procedures for legitimizing authority.16 
Basically, collective behavior theorists view social movements as collective action 
of non-routine forms, working toward social change. Internal organization, norms, and 
culture are not explained because movements are emergent forms which have not acquired 
structured organization. Organization is only acquired during the movements’ life cycles 
14Jenkins, 528. 
15Aldon Morris and Cedric Herring, “Theory and Research in Social Movements: A Critical 
Review,” ed., Samuel Long, Political Behavior Manual, (Norwood, NJ: ABIEX Publishing Co., 1987), 142. 
16Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behavior, 2nd ed, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1972), 246. 
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because once non-routine forms become structured and institutionalized they cease to be 
variables of inquiry as social movements. Therefore organization is not viewed as a part of 
the emergent phase, thus it is barely mentioned in the collective behavior literature.17 
Collective behaviorists place heavy emphasis upon the emergent character of social 
movements.18 
According to mass society theorists, social movements are phenomena that occur 
when unorganized individuals form to challenge some aspect of society.19 Wendell C. King, 
a mass society theorist, defines a social movement as “a group venture extending beyond a 
local community or a single event and involving a systematic effort to inaugurate changes in 
thought, behavior, and social relationships.”20 Mass society theorists examine the 
characteristics of “mass societies.” Cultural confusion, social heterogeneity, weak cultural 
integration mechanisms, and a lack of attachments to secondary group structures are viewed 
as mechanisms which make movements possible. Unlike collective behaviorists, they analyze 
the properties of societies and explain how these factors generate movements directly. Mass 
society theorists’ conception of social movements emphasizes the interface of social structure 
and personality.21 
17 
Morris and Herring, 142. 
18 
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Social Movements,” ed., Neil 
Smelser, Handbook of Sociology, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988), 696. 
19Morris and Herring, 142. 
20 
Wendell C. King, Social Movements in the United States, (New York: Random House, 1956), 
27. 
21 
Moms and Herring, 143. 
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Relative deprivation theorists are more limited in their interests than collective 
behaviorists and mass society theorists because they examine only episodes of political 
violence and revolution. According to Gurr, a leading proponent of relative deprivation, “all 
collective attacks within a political regime, its actors ... or its policies” are concerns for 
research.22 Gurr discusses three forms of political violence: 
Turmoil: Relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with substantial 
popular participation, including violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, 
and localized rebellions. 
Conspiracy: Highly organized political violence with limited participation, 
including organized political assassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale 
guerilla wars, coup d’etat, and mutinies. 
Internal war: Highly organized political violence with widespread popular 
participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and 
accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla 
wars, civil wars, and revolutions.23 
Behavior discussed in relative deprivation literature is viewed as “social 
movement” activity, but relative deprivationists’ emphasis is upon the origins of political 
violence instead of the actual social movements. Theorists examine the origins of political 
violence but do not focus on the dynamics of such violence. Also other forms of political 
protest are largely ignored.24 
The classical models of collective behavior, relative deprivation, and mass society 
may employ different approaches but they do share certain common premises. According to 
22Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 3. 
23Ibid.,ll. 
24Morris and Herring, 143. 
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Morris and Herring, the origins, development, and outcomes of social movements are 
explained by classical models in three ways: 
(a) Structural breakdown that leads to noninstitutionalized social change 
efforts, 
(b) psychological states of movements’ participants, and 
(c) the role shared beliefs play in guiding movements.25 
The role organization and tactical choices play in movements are only occasionally mentioned 
in the literature and are not viewed as major variables. This is a shortcoming of the classical 
models in their analysis of social movements. 
The central message of the classical model of collective behavior is that 
“collective behavior occurs when the established organization ceases to afford direction and 
supply channels for action.”26 Collective behaviorists focus on how individuals in collective 
action situations act collectively in the absence of structure and social organization. Turner 
and Killian, collective behaviorists, argued against the view that the origins of movements 
were without social structure by developing the emergent norm approach. They state that 
collective behavior is guided by a property of social structure-an emergent norm. Since the 
norm is to some degree specific to the situation, differing in degree or in kind from the norms 
governing noncrowd situations, it is an emergent norm. The new, revised, or reapplied norm 
that guides social movements creates a sense of injustice and provides a vital sense that some 
25Ibid.,145. 
26 
Turner and Killian, 246. 
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established practice or mode of thought is wrong and ought to be replaced. The emergent 
norm provides “a common understanding as to what sort of behavior is expected in the 
situation,”27 and it can explain why people with a great variety of motives come to act 
collectively. The emergent norm approach suggests that movements are not vastly different 
from organized behavior. However, this approach does not explicitly link movements with 
internal organization. 
Collective behaviorists’ suggestions that organization and tactics are important 
in the growth and spread of movements are weak. These factors are not strongly presented 
because in terms of emphasis and treatment they “take a back seat to spontaneity, 
construction of meaning frames, and social psychological processes.”28 Organization and 
culture develop during the course of a movement’s career, movements do not emerge with 
structure and organization already established.29 This approach implies that organization may 
be influential in a movement’s development but organization is not a factor in the genesis of 
movements. 
Simply, collective behavior provides little insight into the causal connections 
between movement emergence and social organization. Also, the collective behavior 
perspective does not examine the role of tactics because it often views movements and 
27Ibid.,22. 
28 
Morris and Herring, 148 
29 
Herbert Blumer, “Collective Behavior,” ed., Alfred Lee, New Outline of the Principles of 
Sociology, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1951), 19. 
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activists as creative victims of “evolving realities” rather than as controllers of those 
processes. 
The central message of the classical model mass society is that “mass societies” 
are characterized by detachment and isolation. Mass societies lack strong networks of 
secondary groups, in contrast to well integrated societies that socialize citizens to accept their 
lot and compromise rather than raise challenges. Mass societies have few structures which 
facilitate attachments between elites and masses that usually serve to moderate demands 
placed on elites. Moreover, such societies have a shortage of intermediate groups to penalize 
individuals for engaging in illegitimate means to attain their goals. Finally, because group 
memberships are so low, high levels of alienation and anxiety are pervasive.30 
Proponents of the mass society model argue that mass society characteristics can 
not effectively prevent people from participating in mass movements. Thus secondary groups 
such as religious groups, political parties, and community organizations which normally 
restrain antisocial behaviors, breakdown and become ineffective. The inability of mass 
societies to integrate and restrain individuals during periods of rapid change is the source of 
mass social movements and other non-routine collective action.31 
In the mass society perspective, organizations are integrating mechanisms which 
hinder rather than promote movements. Organizations are not viewed as facilitative 
conditions relevant to the development of movements, more precisely they are viewed as an 
impediment of movements. If organizations were intact and effective there would not be a 
30 
Morris and Herring, 155. 
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need for collective action, according to the mass society perspective. Basically, mass society 
theorists, like collective behaviorists, have relied on life cycle and natural history explanations 
to account for movement processes and outcomes, ignoring movement dynamics. The role 
of tactical choices becomes virtually non-existing. 
The other classical model, relative deprivation, focuses on the relationships 
between social conditions, perceptions of those conditions, and behavior resulting from those 
perceptions. Relative deprivationists argue that when people perceive great discrepancies 
between the power and privileges they possess and the amount they should possess, they 
become frustrated, angered, and subsequently participate in movements and protests to offset 
feelings of deprivation.32 
Relative deprivation does not claim that participants are alienated “rebels without 
a cause,” as the mass society perspective proposes but it does share some other similar 
assumptions. Relative deprivation and mass society theories both claim that movement and 
protest activity: 
(a) are a result of the structural strain of rapid changes in societies, 
(b) are preceded by changes in the psychological state of those who 
participate, 
(c) are guided by emotional rather than meaningful tactical considerations, 




(e) are abnormal because they are not structurally defined by the normal 
operation of institutions, and 
(f) are inherently different from institutional activity.33 
Relative deprivationists focus on macro changes and subsequent psychological changes in 
individuals, providing little emphasis upon the examination of realities and choices that 
actually confront movement participants. Like other classical models, this perspective has not 
illuminated the role of organization or tactical choices in the development and outcome of 
social movements. 
Opposing the view of the classical perspectives, an alternative interpretation was 
developed. This new approach was coined resource mobilization. The resource mobilization 
approach evolved out of the criticisms of the classical perspectives. The resource 
mobilization approach produced different conceptions of social movements and challenged 
the classical perspective’s significance in the study of social movements. 
The resource mobilization approach emphasizes the link between: (1) movement 
and institutionalized actions; (2) the rationality of movement actors; (3) the strategic problems 
confronted by movements; and (4) the role of movements as agencies of social change. More 
precisely, resource mobilization theorists argue that: (a) movement actions are rational, 
adaptive responses to the costs and rewards of different lines of action; (b) the basic goals of 
movements are defined by conflicts of interest built into institutionalized power relations; (c) 
the grievances generated by such conflicts are sufficiently ubiquitous that the formation and 
mobilization of movements depend on changes in resources, group organization, and 
15 
opportunities for collective action; (d) centralized, formally structured movement 
organizations are more typical of modem social movements and more effective at mobilizing 
resources, mounting sustained challenges than decentralized, informal movement structures; 
and (e) the success of movements is largely determined by strategic factors and the political 
processes in which they become emeshed.34 
The political process model, a variant of the resource mobilization approach, 
shares the same elements of the resource mobilization discussed above. However, the 
political process model extends its focus upon strategic factors and the processes that enable 
challengers to pursue power through collective action. Tilly, a leading proponent of the 
political process view, defines a social movement as: 
A sustained series of interactions between national powerholders and persons 
successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal 
representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly-visible 
demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those 
demands with public demonstrations of support.35 
The study of movements is the study of political processes and the collective action it 
generates. The “social movement” is not treated as a unit of analysis. Social movements are 
distinguished from their institutionalized counterparts by their political situation which causes 
them to rely heavily on a repertoire of disorderly tactics such as strikes, demonstrations, 
violence, and protest meetings to accomplish political ends. 
As stated above, the political process model focuses on the excluded interests of 
movements and the processes that enable challengers to pursue power through collective 
34Jenkins, 528. 
35Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978), 12. 
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action. The first requirement is that the challenging groups have internal organization. 
Organization is the extent of common identity and unifying structure among members of the 
challenging groups. Organization is important because, through it, movement groups are able 
to collectively plan and strategize, hold meetings, organize and coordinate demonstrations, 
raise money, and facilitate the mobilization process. In this model, organization is crucial to 
the emergence and success of movements.36 
Though potential movement groups usually possess organizational structures and 
resources, they must be mobilized if challengers are to contend for power. Mobilization refers 
to the process by which challenging groups gain collective control over resources that make 
collective action possible. Thus, “mobilization is a process of increasing the readiness to act 
collectively by building the loyalty of a constituency to an organization.”37 The political 
process model analyzes the link between mobilization process of movement groups and their 
preexisting organizational structures and resources. In this model organizational capacity and 
mobilization are preconditions that must be present if sustained collective action is to occur. 
Often, circumstances are usually not ideal for collective action by movement 
groups. The extent of repression by social control agents and the power position of 
challenging groups play an important role in determining the outcomes of movements. High 
levels of repression can force challengers to withdraw from power struggles because they 
36Morris and Herring, 167. 
37 
William A. Gamson, Strategy of Social Protest, (Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1975), 15. 
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raise the cost of mobilization and collective action.3® In Tilly’s view, repressive action aimed 
at demobilizing the challenging group is an effective strategy against collective action: 
Raising the costs of mobilization is a more reliable repressive strategy than 
raising the costs of collective action alone. The antimobilization strategy 
neutralizes the actor as well as the action, and makes it less likely that the actor 
will be able to act rapidly when the government suddenly becomes vulnerable, a 
new coalition partner arises, or something else quickly shifts the probable costs 
and benefits of collective action.39 
Demobilization can occur when authorities disrupt the challenger’s organization and 
communication system and freeze crucial resources that make a challenge possible. 
Because repressive activities on behalf of the authorities play such an important 
role in movements, strategic choices on behalf of the movements have a huge effect on the 
growth and spread of collective action. Gamson and Schmeidler view “collective action as 
a craft; there are skills and routines for carrying it out.”40 Movement groups are confronted 
with organizational choices, they must decide whether to pursue limited or radical goals or 
some combination. This choice will affect the degree to which authorities employ extensive 
repression against the group. 
In short, the central message of the political process model is that political 
movements emerge within the organizational and resource base of groups pursuing group 
interests and that mobilization of resources makes collective action possible. Furthermore, 




William Gamson and Emilie Schmeidler, “Organizing the Poor,” Theory and Society 13; 
567-585. 
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movement participants and leaders. Likewise, repression by authorities and unfavorable 
political realities increase the chances that challengers will be forced to demobilize and 
withdraw from collective action.41 The political process model provides a framework that 
allows for the analysis of the effect of a challenging movement’s tactical choices and 
responses by authorities, upon the movement’s outcome. 
McAdam, a proponent of the political process model, advances the significance 
of strategic tactics in the development of social movements.42 A fundamental assumption of 
the political process model is that challenging groups exist outside of the polity which means 
that they lack routine, low cost access to resources controlled by the government. 
Opponents rely upon their existence in the polity which allows for access to valuable 
resources, which in turn increases their political power. Therefore, the key obstacle facing 
challenging groups is to devise some way to decrease their political powerlessness. The 
solution to the problem becomes one of tactical choices. Challenging groups bypass routine 
strategies and use non-institutionalized tactics to force their opponents to deal with them 
outside the established arenas from which the latter derive so much of their power .43 
According to McAdam, the emergence of social movements attests to at least 
limited success in their use of disruptive tactics.44 To survive, however, a movement must be 
able to sustain the leverage it has achieved through the use of such tactics. To do it, a 
41 





movement, must either parlay its initial successes into positions of institutionalized power or 
continue to experiment with non-institutionalized forms of protest. Barring the attainment 
of significant institutionalized power, then, the pace of development comes to be crucially 
influenced by the processes of tactical innovation and tactical adaptation. Tactical innovation 
refers to the creativity of challengers in devising new tactical forms. Tactical adaptation refers 
to the ability of opponents to neutralize the challengers’ moves through effective tactical 
counters. Together these processes define an ongoing process of tactical interaction in which 
challengers and opponents seek, in chess like fashion, to offset the moves of the other. How 
well each succeeds at this task crucially affects the growth and success of the challenging 
movement. 
As important as the process of tactical innovation is, it derives much of its 
significance from the larger political/organizational context in which it occurs. McAdam, 
working within the political process model, stresses the importance of two structural factors 
in the emergence of challenging groups.45 The first is the level of internal organization within 
the aggrieved population, which can be conceived of as the degree of organizational 
“readiness” within the particular community. The second is the larger political environment, 
which can be viewed as the “structure of political opportunities” available to challenging 
groups. 
Internal organization furnishes the context in which tactical innovations are 
devised and subsequently carried out.46 Such organization serves to mobilize community 
20 
resources in support of new tactical forms and to supply leaders to direct their use, 
participants to carry them out, and communication networks to facilitate their use and 
dissemination to other challenging groups. The effectiveness of such organizations and the 
tactical innovations they employ also depend, to a considerable degree, on characteristics of 
the larger political environment which challenging groups confront. Challenging groups often 
face enormous obstacles in their efforts to advance group interests. The political 
establishment is often united against movement goals and therefore largely immune to 
pressure from movement groups. Under such circumstances tactical innovations are apt to 
be repressed or ignored rather than triggering expanded growth. Tactical innovations only 
become potent in the context of a political system vulnerable to insurgency.47 Expanding 
political opportunities then create a potential for the exercise of political leverage which 
challengers seek to exploit. 
If expanding opportunities and established organizations presage movement 
emergence, it is the skill of challenging groups in devising effective tactics and their 
opponents ability to counter such tactics that largely determine the development and outcome 
of such movements.48 The political process literature has shown that tactical choices are 
significant in contributing to the success or failure of social movements. This study will focus 
on how the tactical choices of the Black Panther Party contributed to its development and its 







For the purpose of this work the political process model will be utilized as the 
theoretical perspective in understanding the political life of the Black Panther Party. As stated 
earlier, the political process model provides a framework that allows for the analysis of a 
challenging movement’s tactical choices and responses by authorities upon the movement’s 
outcome. Moreover, the strength of the political process model, its examination of internal 
organization and political environment, should provide a capable base for this research. Given 
a political environment vulnerable to challenge and a strong internal organization the main 
challenge for movement groups is primarily a tactical one.49 Internal organization refers to 
the degree of readiness within a particular community to act. Such an organization serves to 
mobilize community resources in support of new tactical forms and to provide leaders to 
direct their use, participants to carry them out, and develops communication networks to 
facilitate their use and dissemination to other movement groups. Political environment refers 
to the political opportunities available to challenging groups, such as a community’s complaint 
of police brutality, intense poverty whereas citizens are unable to receive proper nutrition or 
proper health care, as well as race and class conflicts which inhibit the alliance of challenging 
groups struggling for similar goals. Also, the concepts of tactical innovation and tactical 
adaptation developed by McAdam allow for an in depth analysis of the tactics initiated by the 
Black Panther Party and the subsequent responses of the established governmental agencies. 
Adopting McAdam’s concept of tactical interaction within the context of the 




of: How did the Black Panther Party utilize tactics such as armed self-defense, creation of 
survival programs, and coalitions with other challenging groups to offset the political power 
of the authorities? What was the response of authorities to such tactics? And to what extent 
did the Black Panther Party’s choice of tactics affect the development and outcome of the 
organization? 
Methods 
This is a case study of the Black Panther Party which largely uses a historical 
approach in the analysis of tactical choices and organizational outcomes. The study focuses 
on the political processes which enabled the Black Panther Party to pursue social change 
through collective action. These political processes include the tactical choices, internal 
organization, political environment, and responses of the authorities between 1966 and 1975. 
Tactical choices refers to the use of armed self-defense, survival programs, and coalitions by 
the Black Panther Party. Internal organization is defined as the degree of readiness within a 
particular community to act. Political environment refers to the political opportunities 
available to challenging groups. 
Because of the qualitative nature of this study secondary sources were the major 
data sources utilized. The sources consisted of autobiographies, news articles, and literature 
published by the Black Panther Party during the research time frame. Sources such as these 
served as a viable asset in attempting to ascertain the facts regarding the tactical maneuvers 
of the Black Panther Party, the political environment of the time period in which they existed, 
and the response of the authorities to the Party’s activities. For example, a significant 
amount of information pertaining to the daily operations of the Black Panther Party and its 
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political environment was found in a collection of the official Black Panther Party newspaper, 
The Black Panther, during the Party’s existence. 
The underlying principles/assumptions of the framework for this study are: (a) 
movement actions are rational; (b) the basic goals of movements are defined by conflicts of 
interest built into institutionalized power relations; (c) the mobilization of movements depend 
on changes in resources, group organization, and opportunities for collective action; (d) 
centralized, formally structured movement organizations are more effective at mounting 
sustained challenges than decentralized, informal movement structures; (e) the success of 
movements is largely determined by strategic factors and the political processes in which they 
become emeshed. 
In this largely qualitative study, the tactical choices of armed self-defense, survival 
programs and coalitions, as well as internal organization, political environment and responses 
of authorities, may be seen as independent set. The development and outcome may be seen 
as the dependent set. 
Given the theoretical framework and the measures as stated in the independent 
and dependent sets, the following research questions are most salient in terms of the overall 
objectives: (1) What was the state of the Black Panther Party’s internal organization when 
tactics such as armed self-defense, survival programs, and coalitions were initiated? (2) What 
was the political environment in which such tactics were initiated by the Black Panther Party? 
(3) How were the tactics implemented? (4) What were the responses from the established 
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authorities? and (5) What affect did the Black Panther Party’s tactical choices have upon the 
development and outcome of the organization? 
Thesis Outline 
The remaining five chapters collectively express the purpose and rationale of this 
research. Chapter two details the history of the Black Panther Party and its organizational 
structure. Chapter three reviews the Party’s use and advocation of armed self-defense. 
Chapter four explains the creation and implementation of the Party’s survival programs. 
Chapter five provides a discussion of the Party’s working coalitions and alliances. Chapter 
six, the final chapter, summarizes and concludes the discussion of tactical choices upon the 
development and outcome of the Black Panther Party. 
CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORY OF ORGANIZATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed history of the Black Panther 
Party and its organizational structure. Such a discussion is critical to this work because it 
helps to explicate the findings in the following chapters. 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the Black Panther Party evolved out of 
the political agitation and grassroots militancy of the 1960’s. While attending Merrit 
Community College, in Oakland, California, Huey Newton and Bobby Seale began to develop 
a relationship. Their bond strengthened and their political awareness increased as they 
participated in various organizations. Initially both identified with the Afro-American 
Association, then shared a brief stint with the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), finally 
Newton and Seale assumed leading roles in the Soul Students Advisory Council.1 The latter 
campaigned for black history courses at Merrit College. Working with these groups2 
expanded the two men’s political consciousness and contacts in the Oakland Bay Area, but 
'Huey P. Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, (New York: Writers and Publishing, 1995), 105. 
2The Afro-American Association, the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), and the Soul 
Students Advisory Council were organizations that functioned in the Oakland area. Huey Newton and Bobby 
Seale believed that the Afro-American Association and RAM were cultural nationalists, a philosophy which 
was in conflict with their own beliefs. RAM, an “underground” organization, would later have several violent 
encounters with the Black Panther Party. The Soul Students Advisory Council was formed by Newton and 
Seale along with other students at Merrit College. This organization was formed out of the contempt of the 
cultural nationalists mentioned above, but suffered due the limitations of being a college based organization. 
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both became dissatisfied with the above mentioned organizations’ inability to transform 
community discontent into militant collective action.3 
Newton and Seale saw the need for an organization that would appeal particularly 
to young urban blacks from working class backgrounds. They both were greatly influenced 
by Marxist literature, the writings of Frantz Fanon, and most notably Malcolm X. The two 
viewed Malcolm X as a model leader who was able to communicate with black people on all 
educational levels and whose message went beyond nationalist rhetoric about racial pride. 
Malcolm X’s harsh criticisms of established civil rights leaders and call for freedom “by any 
means necessary” greatly impressed the two men. Newton later would described the Panthers 
as “a living testament” to Malcolm X’s life work.4 
Following the assassination of Malcolm X in February of 1965, according to 
Louis Heath, Newton and Seale became even more determined to find or create a black 
militant group that embodied Malcolm X’s political ideas. The Watts’ rebellion in the summer 
of that same year demonstrated for the two that the conditions were ripe for a new direction 
in African American politics. The two men began by canvassing the black sections of 
Oakland in an attempt to ascertain the needs and desires of the people. As a result of this 
activity, Newton, then 24, and Seale, not quite 30 yet, formulated a Ten Point Platform and 
Program which they felt represented the wants and beliefs of the black community. Newton 




this document as their program, the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense was officially 
formed in October 1966.5 
Assuming the titles of Minister of Defense and Chairman, respectively, of the 
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, Newton and Seale directed the organization’s rapid 
growth during the winter and spring of 1967. The first recruit of the Party was Bobby 
Hutton, who would become the Minister of Finance. Newton and Seale had met the 
seventeen year old Hutton at the North Oakland Service Center where they both were 
working. Another important early recruit was David Hilliard, a childhood friend of Newton’s, 
who became the Party’s Chief of Staff.6 
The Party raised money by selling books; Quotations of Chairman Mao and 
Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth. With proceeds from the book sales several guns were 
purchased, more literature was printed, and the first Panther Party headquarters was opened 
in a $150 per month storefront building in Oakland. Weapons were a major interest to the 
Party and were acquired as rapidly as possible for the early recruits.7 According to Seale, 
guns were used to attract the young militant youths, who, once a part of the organization, 
would then become introduced to the writings of Marx, Mao, and Fanon. At Party 
headquarters the recruits were drilled in technical and legal details involved in the handling 
and use of guns.8 In the state of California the public display of a guns was legal at that time. 





The Party’s considerable appeal among young blacks was based on its willingness 
to confront the police. The issue of police brutality was of great concern to black urban 
residents, and the Panthers articulated these widespread anti-police sentiments. At the end 
of 1966, the Party established patrols to monitor police activities within the black community 
of Oakland to ensure that the civil rights of black people were respected. The police patrols 
oftentimes drew large crowds as the Panthers would question police conduct. Newton, a pre¬ 
law student, would also read aloud relevant portions of the California legal code. As their 
numbers increased, the Panthers expanded their operations from Oakland to Richmond, 
Berkeley, and San Francisco. In addition to discouraging police harassment, the Panther 
patrols educated black residents about their ability to contest violations of their rights (see 
Chapter 3).9 
Two of the Black Panther Party’s more publicized earlier actions were the 
escorting of Betty Shabazz and the Panthers California State Capital protest of the Mulford 
Bill(see Chapter 3). These two incidents increased the Panthers’ local and national notoriety 
and attracted many new members. One of those attracted to the Black Panther Party was 
Eldridge Cleaver, an already well known writer and former convict. The Panthers first caught 
Cleaver’s attention in February 1967 when he witnessed a tense standoff between police and 
an armed contingent of Panthers guarding Betty Shabazz, the widow of Malcolm X. 
Impressed by their militancy, he attended the State Capital protest, and, despite his claim that 
he was merely an observer, was arrested with other Panthers.10 Threatened with a return to 
’Newton, 155-158. 
'“Clayborne Carson, foreword lo The Black Panthers Speak, ed., Philip S. Foner, ed., (New 
York: Da Capo Press, 1995), xi. 
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prison for violating his parole, Cleaver began a highly publicized legal battle against California 
authorities. Determined to maintain ties with the Panthers, Cleaver officially joined the Party 
in May 1967 and quickly became one of its most effective and best known spokepersons as 
well as editor of The Black Panther, the official voice of the Party. His position as a writer 
for the New Left journal, Ramparts, brought the organization additional publicity and created 
a link between the Panthers and white leftist sympathizers.11 
Cleaver’s prominence in the Black Panther Party increased after October 28, 1967 
when Newton was arrested after an altercation ending in the death of an Oakland police 
officer (see Chapter 3).12 The Panthers immediately mobilized to free Newton, who faced a 
possible death sentence if convicted. As part of this support effort, Cleaver and Seale 
contacted Stokely Carmichael, chairman of SNCC and nationally known Black Power 
proponent. Cleaver and Seale drafted Carmichael to be the Panther’s Prime Minister, and 
offered positions to other SNCC officers, including H. Rap Brown and James Forman. 
Carmichael, Brown, and Forman agreed to join other black militant groups in “Free Huey” 
rallies to be held in Los Angeles and Oakland during February 1968. These well attended 
events increased the national visibility of the Black Panther Party and broadened support for 
the effort to free Newton.13 Despite the success of the February rallies, internal and external 
"Ibid., xii. 
l2KathIeen Rout, Eldridge Cleaver, (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991), 66. 
13Black Panther Party, The Black Panther, 16 March 1968. 
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factors made it difficult to build an alliance between the Panthers and the SNCC (see Chapter 
5)- 
Constant confrontations with police and covert disruptive activities of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s(FBI) counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) made it difficult 
for the Party to function effectively. As explained in a February 1968 memorandum, the 
FBT’s COINTELPRO operations were intended to “neutralize militant black nationalists” and 
forestall “a coalition of militant Black nationalist groups” and prevent the emergence of a 
“Black Messiah.”14 The FBI tactics disrupted Panthers organizing efforts and strengthened 
the tendency of Panthers to suspect the motives of black militants who questioned the group’s 
strategy or tactics. FBI disinformation campaigns (anonymous phone calls or letters and 
planted newspaper stories) exploited the Panther Party’s vulnerabilities, especially the 
tendency toward rhetorical excess and its heavy handed efforts to intimidate critics.15 
Even as the Party attempted to change its course, removing “for Self-Defense” 
from its title in 1968 to emphasize its political actions and not its “military” image, direct and 
covert external attacks threatened its existence.16 On April 6, 1968 police attacked a house 
containing several Panthers, killing Bobby Hutton, and wounding Cleaver. Cleaver was 
charged with three counts of attempted murder of a police officer and three counts of 
assaulting a police officer. On 12 June 1968 Cleaver was released on $50,000 bail (see 
14Ward Churchill, Wall Churchill, and Jim Vander, Agents of Repression, (Boston: South End 
Press, 1968), 107. 
’’Kenneth O’Reilly, Racial Matters, (New York: Free Press, 1989), 293-324. 
16Heath, 32. 
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Chapter 3). In September 1968 Newton was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and 
sentenced to two to fifteen years in prison. On the same day that Newton was sentenced 
Cleaver was ordered to return to jail, his parole re-revoked, in sixty days. Cleaver, avoiding 
another prison term and trial, left for exile in Cuba and then Algeria.17 
According to O’Reilly, during 1969 continued FBI COINTELPRO plots directed 
against the Black Panther Party decimated its leadership and disrupted its relations with other 
militant organizations. In Southern California, these covert activities exacerbated conflicts 
between the Party and followers of black nationalist Maulana Karenga and culminated in a 
gun battle in January 1969 on the UCLA campus that left two Panthers dead. In March 1969 
Seale was arrested for conspiracy to incite rioting at the 1968 Democratic convention in 
Chicago, and in May, 1969, Connecticut officials charged Seale and seven other Panthers with 
murder in the slaying of Party member Alex Rackley, who was believed to be a police 
informant. In New York, 21 Panthers(New York 21) were charged with plotting to 
assassinate policemen and blow up buildings. Then in December 1969 police killed two 
Chicago Panther leaders, Fred Hampton and Mark Clark while the two were sleeping at 
Hampton’s apartment. The police raid was planned with the help of a police informer and 
coordinated with the United States Department of Justice.18 Other covert operations by the 
FBI and local police forces further intensified the sometimes vicious factionalism within the 





This was particularly the case after Cleaver, speaking from exile in Algeria, 
increased his calls for violent revolution while Newton and Seale were seeking to moderate 
the Party’s image (see Chapter 3).20 The FBI heightened mutual suspicions through 
anonymous letters and other actions that transformed leadership competition and ideological 
differences into intense conflicts. Newton, for example, reacted to a planted story in a local 
newspaper that Los Angeles Panther leader Geronimo Pratt was participating in 
“counterrevolutionary” activities and a police agent by expelling him.21 In 1971 Newton 
expelled the New York 21 shortly before its members’ trial on conspiracy charges after the 
FBI led him to believe that they were plotting with Cleaver to take over the Party.22 
In 1970, when Newton was released on bail after his conviction on a 
manslaughter charge was reversed on appeal, he returned to find the Party in disarray. Seale 
still faced conspiracy charges in the murder of Rackley (they were dropped the following 
year). Chief of Staff David Hilliard awaited trial on charges of verbally threatening the life 
of President Nixon. Some chapters, particularly those in the eastern United States, resisted 
direction from the Oakland headquarters. According to Carson, many chapters were heavily 
infiltrated by police or FBI informants.23 One of these informants, Earl Anthony, had been 
active in disrupting the Party’s operation in Los Angeles.24 
20Carson, xv. 
21Black Panther Party, 23 January 1971. 
22Black Panther Party, 13 February 1971. 
23Carson, xv. 
24Earl Anthony, Spitting in the Wind, (Malibu, California: Roundtable, 1990). 
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Newton sought to revive the Party and reestablish his control by de-emphasizing 
police confrontations in favor of survival programs that would meet the everyday needs of 
black communities while also educating black people. During the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s the Black Panther Party concentrated on developing three main programs: free 
breakfast for children, liberation schools, and free medical/health clinics. Such programs 
attracted new members, allowed Panthers to interact with diverse segments of black 
communities, and helped to counter the Party’s negative image in the media (see Chapter 4).25 
Newton’s efforts to shift the Black Panther Party’s emphasis from revolutionary 
rhetoric and armed confrontations to survival programs did not prevent further external 
attacks and internal conflicts from plaguing the organization. The decision to change course 
prompted an open break with Cleaver, who continued to argue from exile that the black 
“lumpenproletariat” were ready for revolution. Newton asserted that Cleaver's leadership had 
caused the Black Panther Party to become “a revolutionary cult group” that had lost touch 
with the black community.26 
Throughout the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, efforts to purge members 
considered disloyal or unreliable were at times counterproductive and disrupted Panther 
chapters. In addition, the Party’s hierarchical, military-style structure exposed the limitations 
of Newton and other officers. As Elaine Brown later conceded, the Party was “not a 
democratic organization,” and by early 1970’s its principle of “democratic centralism” 
25Philip S. Foner, ed., The Black Panthers Speak, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), 160. 
26Black Panther Party, 25 May 1971. 
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generally was “reduced to one man, Huey Newton, though the Central Committee still 
influenced the governance of the Party, since its members held individual fields of sway.”27 
By the mid-1970’s the Panthers had been weakened by years of external attacks, legal 
problems, and internal schisms. Most Panther veterans, including Seale and Cleaver, left or 
were expelled from the Party. Popular support for the Party waned after newspaper reports 
appeared describing the organization’s involvement in illicit activities, such as extortion and 
drug racketering.2* In a hostile political climate, the Black Panther Party could not reverse 
its decline as a political force and soon faded from the American scene in the mid-1970’s. 
Organizational Structure 
Prior to April 1968 the Black Panther Party leadership consisted of co-founders, 
Minister of Defense Huey Newton and Chairman Bobby Seale. These titles had seemingly 
little to do with their role or duties. The structure of the Party was developed as the 
organization grew. There was not a lot of consistency in much of the ranking or areas of 
responsibility. The Central Committee was the highest leadership body. It was formed by 
Bobby Seale in April 1968, the same month Dr. Martin Luther King, the most notable 
representative of the non-violence movement, was assassinated. The frustration over King’s 
death led many former non-violence followers and young activists to seek other organizations 
and methods. One such organization was the Black Panther Party who offered a much more 
27Elaine Brown, A Taste of Power, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 320. 
28Such activities are emphasized in Hugh Pearson’s The Shadow of the Panther (Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1994). 
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militant approach to the African American struggle. Seale, aware of the growing interest in 
the Party, developed the Central Committee which was designed to provide stronger 
organization and leadership for the increasing membership.29 The year of 1968 marked the 
shift of the Black Panther Party from a relatively localized operation to an organization with 
1500 to 2000 members in chapters scattered across the country,30 and is generally agreed to 
be the Party’s peak year in terms of membership.31 
The Central Committee in 1968 consisted of the following persons: 
Minister of Defense: Huey Newton 
Chairman: Bobby Seale 
Minister of Information: Eldridge Cleaver 
Chief of Staff: David Hilliard 
Minister of Finance: Bobby Hutton, succeeded in April by Melvin Newton 
Minister of Education: George Murray 
Minister of Culture: Emoty Douglass 
Prime Minister: Stokely Carmichael 
Minister of Justice: H. Rap Brown 
Minister of Foreign Affairs: James Forman 
Communication Secretary: Kathleen Cleaver32 
As the highest governing body of the Black Panther Party, the Central Committee 
was responsible for developing theory and providing direction to Party members. The Central 
Committee was to operate in a democratic manner with each member having a vote. This 
process was hampered due to the fact that many of its members were imprisoned or exiled.33 
29Heath, 118. 
"Ibid., 116. 
3lMost accounts in the Panther literature regard 1968 as the year the Black Panther Party held 




During the spring of 1968 the Black Panther Party began “chartering” groups in 
various cities who were calling themselves Black Panthers. Charters were simply the 
recognition by national headquarters that an emerging group was one its official chapters. 
Each official chapter agreed to meet the qualifications established by the national office. The 
decision to grant charters was dictated by Party leadership’s desire to exert more control over 
the growing Panther movement throughout the country. Persons who aspired to lead new 
chapters were eventually required to appear at the Party’s Oakland headquarters for six weeks 
of training and indoctrination. Trainees attended political education classes and learned 
administrative and reporting procedures to keep the national office informed about chapter 
activity. Individuals approved by the Party leadership were permitted to form a chapter. 
Chapter leaders assumed one or another of the following ranks: deputy chairman, defense 
captain, or deputy defense minister. Chapters were required to submit periodic reports of 
their activities and financial status. Individually large or well-run chapters such as Kansas 
City, Chicago, and New York were given “regional” authority to help headquarters supervise 
chapters separated by thousands of miles. Penalties for errant chapters ranged from 
admonitions to suspension or expulsion of various chapter officers and members. In 
situations in which the entire membership was not inclined to follow policies of the national 
office, the chapter charter was revoked.34 
By the fall of 1969, Cleaver, exiled in Algeria, along with other Panther members 
developed an International Bureau. The Algerian government not only extended political 
MIbid„ 120-121. 
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asylum to the Panthers but also offered official liberation movement status. This meant that 
the Algerian government was recognizing the Black Panther Party as the sole representative 
of the African American liberation struggle. Benefitting from such status the Panther Party 
was given a large chateau and a budget to operate its office. With this support and extended 
resources the International Bureau was initiated in Algiers, Algeria. The stated goal of the 
International Bureau was to inform the world of the plight of blacks in America, to explain 
the purpose of the Panther Party, and to forge unity with other liberation movements and 
progressive nations.35 
Until winter 1969, before the purge of many Black Panther Party members, an 
individual desiring to join the Party went through a six week training period. Upon 
completion of the six week program, which consisted of political classes, training in the use 
of arms, and community work, the individual officially became a member. Following the 1969 
purge, the Party ranks were closed. Persons wanting to join were allowed to function in the 
capacity of “community worker.” Community workers did rank and file work but were not 
permitted to assume leadership roles. A community worker could be promoted but there was 
no formal process. In many chapters, community workers who demonstrated leadership 
qualities were elevated to Panther status and then given leadership responsibilities and 
duties.36 The Black Panther Party organizational structure was formed as the Party developed 
and in many instances was unable to adapt to the Party’s difficult circumstances. 
35Black Panther Party, 26 September 1970. 
36Assata Shakur, Assata: An Autobiography, (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and 
Company, 1987), 172. 
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As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the purpose of this chapter was to 
provide an organizational history and structure of the Black Panther Party. The importance 
of this chapter lies in the fact that it helps illuminate much of what is described and analyzed 
in the following chapters. 
CHAPTER THREE 
ARMED SELF-DEFENSE 
The first of the tactics implemented by the Black Panther Party was the advocacy 
and use of armed self-defense. Originally named the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense but 
later removing the “for Self-Defense” title in 1968, the Party from its inception utilized the 
concept of weapons as a political tool. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the Party was 
heavily influenced by the teachings of Malcolm X, Mao Tse Tung, and Frantz Fanon. 
According to Seale, statements such as “Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun,” 
by Mao Tse Tung and “We will get our freedom by any means necessary,” by Malcolm X 
served as valuable political material in the development of the Black Panther Party.1 The role 
of organization and the political environment were critical in the implementation of the armed 
defense tactic. The organization was in its early stage and sought the most relevant issues 
within the black community of the Oakland area to address and to establish the group as a 
vanguard Party. With less than a dozen members and a political environment vulnerable for 
challengers, due to poor police and community relations, the Black Panther Party utilized a 
political opportunity to mobilize support of its goals. 
The tactical choice of armed self-defense was initiated at the end of 1966 as a 
response to incidents of police brutality reported within the Oakland metropolitan area. 
'Bobby Seale, Seize The Time, (Baltimore, Maryland: Black Classic Press, 1991), 63. 
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Addressing point number seven of the Ten Point Program and Platform, “We want an 
immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of Black people,” the Black Panther 
Party developed a program designed to patrol the police. The program consisted of armed 
Panthers patrolling the Oakland area attempting to uncover any police wrongdoings. While 
on patrol members were legally equipped with firearms, law books, and at times a camera. 
If members happened to encounter the police acting in a manner which they perceived to be 
unlawful they would approach the situation and advise the detained persons of their rights. 
The Panthers were trained to handle their interactions with the police in a legal fashion, which 
included proper use of firearms and obeying the legal distance in which persons must stay 
while the police are questioning or arresting someone.2 
In April of 1967, the Black Panther Party organized a community protest against 
the police killing of a young African American, Denzil Dowell. Denzil Dowell was allegedly 
shot nine or ten times by a Contra Costa County deputy sheriff a few miles from Oakland, in 
cold blood.3 Utilizing the death of Denzil Dowell as an example of the need for the 
community to defend itself from the attacks of the police, the Black Panther Party introduced 
a community educational campaign. The first issue of The Black Panther newspaper, the 
official voice of the Black Panther Party, had a headline concerning the death of Dowell.4 The 
2Robert Allen, Black Awakening in Capitalist America, (Garden City, New York: Anchor 
Books, 1970), 82. 
3Claybome Carson, foreword to The Black Panthers Speak, ed., Philip S. Foner, (New York: 
Da Capo Press, 1995), xi. 
4Black Panther Party, The Black Panther Party, 25 April 1967. 
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Black Panther Party educational campaign consisted of street rallies protesting police brutality 
and advocating the use of armed defense. 
Shortly after the Black Panther Party initiated the police patrols its activities 
began to attract the attention of the Oakland police department.5 The police would often stop 
and confront the Panther members. Once the Black Panther Party became an object of police 
activities, the patrols were no longer effective in monitoring police activity towards the 
community; rather, the Panthers found themselves reacting to police harassment directed at 
themselves. Within the first months of the police patrols, local officials in Oakland devised 
ways to block the Panther patrols. Panthers cited incidents in which the local police would 
constantly stop members for the slightest discrepancies. For example, according to Seale, in 
the spring of 1967 Newton, Hutton, and Seale himself were stopped by the police while 
legally carrying weapons. The officers detained their car and asked for the weapons. The 
three Panthers denied the request due to their knowledge of their constitutional rights. At this 
time a large crowd had gathered at the location where the group was stopped and more 
officers were called to the scene. Without any viable reason for arrest, the officers decided 
to charge the three Panthers with something, so Newton was ticketed for having a loose 




of police activity, it did provide the Party with an opportunity to demonstrate through action 
how to defend one’s rights.7 
During the year of 1967 the Black Panther Party engaged in other publicly 
displayed armed political activities. For example, at many of their rallies they often were 
armed. In February of 1967 the Party staged its first major publicized armed action.8 This 
involved the visit of Betty Shabazz, widow of slain human rights leader Malcolm X. The 
Panthers along with other Bay area groups were sponsoring a celebration in honor of 
Malcolm X. The Panthers were to provide armed security for Ms. Shabazz upon her arrival 
at the San Francisco airport. The presence of armed Panthers at the airport caused alarm and 
confusion among airport security. An armed standoff between Panthers and airport police 
was filmed by news reporters covering Ms. Shabazz’s arrival. That same day while escorting 
Ms. Shabazz, the Panthers had a tense standoff with the police, due to their legal display of 
guns. This incident was also witnessed by many people and filmed by newspeople. The 
police converged in force upon the armed Panthers. The Panthers dared the police to draw 
their guns and again the police backed off.9 
On behalf of the city’s attempt to halt the Black Panther Party’s use of firearms 
as a political tool, an Oakland State Assemblyman, Don Mulford, introduced a bill in the state 
Tbid, 82-83. 
8G. Vaughn, “Frightening Army at San Francisco Airport,” San Francisco Chronicle, 22 
February 1967. 
’Philip S. Foner, ed., The Black Panthers Speak, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), xxx. 
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legislature to outlaw the public display of weapons.10 In response to the bill, Minister of 
Defense Huey Newton, wrote the second official document of the Black Panther Party, 
Executive Mandate Number One (the first official document was the Ten Point Program and 
Platform). An excerpt of the document expresses the Party’s thoughts concerning the 
Mulford Bill: 
The Black Panther Party calls upon the American people in general, and 
Black people in particular, to take careful note of the racist California Legislature 
now considering legislation aimed at keeping Black people disarmed and 
powerless while racist police agencies throughout the country intensify the terror, 
brutality, murder, and repression of Black people.11 
Following the Party’s policy of direct action accompanying political statements, 
a delegation of 26 armed Panthers went to the California State Assembly in Sacramento to 
demonstrate the Party’s disapproval of the bill and illustrate its belief in armed defense. The 
delegation, led by Chairman Seale, entered into the State Assembly armed. Before Seale was 
able to read Executive Mandate Number One the group was ushered out of the Capital 
building. On the steps of the building, with national news coverage, Seale read the mandate 
as the other Black Panther Party members stood by with their weapons. The action in 
Sacramento provided the Party with international press exposure as all the major networks 
covered the story of armed blacks “invading” the California Capital building.12 
l0Jerry Belcher, "Oakland Black Panthers Wear Guns, Talk Revolution," San Francisco 
Examiner, 30 April 1967. 
"Huey P. Newton, To Die For The People, (New York: Random House, 1972), 7-8. 
"Eldridge Cleaver, Post Prison Writings and Speeches, (New York: Random House, 1969), 33. 
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The passage of the Mulford Bill resulted in the ending of the police patrols during 
the latter part of the spring of 1967. The public display of arms was now illegal, therefore, 
the police patrols were no longer a legal and effective method of monitoring police behavior.13 
Because of the national attention from the Sacramento action and the notoriety the Panthers 
were developing in the Bay area, many young men began joining the organization. Also, 
other local political organizations and individuals began to work with the Party, most notably 
author/activist/ex-prisoner, Eldridge Cleaver. Following these highly publicized activities the 
Party began to incorporate other methods to organize the community around police brutality 
and armed defense. The Panther newspaper increasingly was employed to express the 
political ideas of the Black Panther Party. 
In July of 1967, Huey Newton wrote an article titled, “The Correct Handling of 
the Revolution.” In this article Newton proclaimed the Black Panther Party as a vanguard 
revolutionary organization. The article elevated the philosophy of the Party beyond the 
concept of armed defense by explaining the method whereby the Panthers intended to lead 
the black masses towards revolution. For example: 
The primary job of the Party is to provide leadership for the people. It 
must teach by words and action the correct strategic methods of prolonged 
resistance. When the people learn that it is no longer advantageous for them to 
resist by going into the streets in large numbers, and when they see the advantage 





To this point the Black Panther Party’s program and propaganda were primarily 
concerned with the immediate defense of the black community. This article presented greater 
objectives which were focused upon sparking a revolution. However, this apparent escalation 
of objectives did not officially mark a corresponding escalation of tactics on the part of the 
Panthers. Rather than organizing and implementing urban guerilla warfare, the Black Panther 
Party increased its mass political activities. Within a year of the inception of the Party its 
educational endeavors concerning armed defense were increasingly on a propaganda level.15 
In speech after speech by major Party leaders, armed revolution was advocated and the right 
of self-defense urged. While the Black Panther Party did not officially engage in 
revolutionary violence or guerilla warfare (as defined by Huey Newton), the Party did 
continue to set examples in respect to armed defense due to the increased police 
confrontations the members encountered. 
Even though the armed police patrols were discontinued, the Party remained the 
object of local and state government attention. As a result of the Sacramento action, Seale 
and a few other Panthers served prison terms of up to eight months for conspiracy to commit 
a misdemeanor. The misdemeanor was disturbing the peace.16 Minister of Information, 
Eldridge Cleaver was ordered by the California parole board to limit his public speaking 
because of his arrest at the Sacramento Action. Cleaver was not formally charged due to the 
fact that he was not armed at the protest and insisted he was covering the story for 
l5Black Panther Party, 19 August 1967. 
16Seale, 176. 
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Ramparts.17 Apparently, Cleaver was silenced by the authorities simply because of his 
affiliation with the Black Panther Party. 
On October 26, 1967, Huey Newton was stopped by a police car while driving 
through Oakland. A shoot-out ensued and one police officer was killed while another was 
wounded as was Newton.18 Throughout his three trials Newton maintained that he did not 
shoot the officer and that he was not even carrying a weapon at the time. The gun that killed 
the officer and wounded the other was never recovered. The shooting and arrest of Newton 
was a culmination of a yearlong antagonistic and hostile relation between the Oakland police 
and the Black Panther Party. As the Black Panther Party mobilized support for Newton the 
police encounters continued. Panther members were constantly stopped on routine violations. 
Both Bobby Seale’s house in Berkeley and Eldridge Cleaver’s house in San Francisco were 
raided by police.19 By this time many Panthers did not carry guns while they worked in the 
community because of the restrictions of the Mulford Bill. Cleaver for one was forbidden to 
possess firearms as a condition of his parole. Less than two years old and not yet a national 
force, the Black Panther Party felt it was under siege by the police and other governmental 
agencies. 
l7Ibid, 173. 
18"A Black Panther Call On Police," San Francisco Chronicle, 10 November 1967. 
19Seale, 223. 
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On March 1, 1968, Huey Newton issued Executive mandate Number Three. This 
official statement/position of the Party was a response to the predicament in which Party 
members found themselves. In this document Newton states; 
... that the situation is critical. Our organization has received serious threats. 
We draw the line at the threshold of our doors. It is therefore mandated as a 
general order to all members of the B.P.P. for Self Defense that all members must 
acquire the technical equipment to defend their homes . . . Any member of the 
Party having such technical equipment who fails to defend his threshold shall be 
expelled from the Party for Life.20 
On April 6, 1968 while making final preparations for a rally, three carloads of 
Party members were stopped by the police. According to Cleaver, the Panthers that were 
present have claimed that the police began shooting without provocation and that only one 
rifle was in the possession of any Panther.21 After hiding in a house for over two hours, 
Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver and Minister of Finance Bobby Hutton, walked out 
with their hands up. Hutton was ordered by the police to run to a waiting police car. While 
running Hutton was shot numerous times by the police. Seventeen years old, Hutton was the 
first member of the Black Panther Party to be killed by the police.22 Hutton’s murder 
occurred only days after the assassination of Dr, Martin Luther King and according to Seale, 
incited a terrible frustration and rage in the Oakland community. To calm the tension of the 
community, Seale held a press conference urging the community not to spontaneously riot, 
20Newton, 12-13. 
21Cleaver, 88. 
22Dexter Waugh, "New Version of Hutton Slaying," San Francisco Examiner, 18 April 1968. 
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but to organize. Seale suggested that a riot would only allow the “Gestapo” policemen an 
opportunity to kill more innocent people.23 
The combination of the two shooting incidents involving the Panthers and the 
police along with the initial highly publicized armed actions provided the Party with a 
significant amount of practice to fuel its educational campaign. Initially the Black Panther 
Party devised programs to demonstrate its official theory of armed defense. By 1968, much 
of the demonstrations were through its own stance against activities directed towards them 
by law enforcement agencies. Gone in most locals were the patrols of police and open display 
of guns. The party utilized the attacks on its members as a mobilizing tool for armed defense. 
Nationally, chapters began to form and Party membership grew greatly during 1968.24 
As mentioned above, in April 1968 Dr Martin Luther King was assassinated. For 
many urban youth his death marked a turn from non-violent methods to a more militant 
approach. The constant incidents of police brutality in many northern and western cities and 
the death of the civil rights movement’s most prolific leader led many youth to join the Black 
Panther Party. The Black Panther Party provided a militant philosophy of armed defense and 
revolution. Uninspired by the progress of the civil rights movement in improving the 
conditions of their daily lives, black youths joined the ranks of the Black Panther Party. As 
a result, the Party enjoyed its greatest growth in the year of 1968. 
“Seale, 236-237. 
24Louis Heath, Off the Pigs, (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1976), 22. 
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From 1968-1971 a nationwide pattern of repressive governmental activity against 
the Black Panther Party emerged.25 The Counter Intelligence Program(COINTELPRO) of 
the FBI was targeted at the Panthers. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover wrote: 
The purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor is to expose, disrupt, 
misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of Black Nationalist, 
hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership 
and supporters.26 
When government agencies attacked, the Party’s practice and politics of armed 
defense hardened. Shootouts ensued across the nation between the Panthers and the police, 
leaving many members dead. According to O’Reilly, when the Newton and Hutton incidents 
are included, Party members engaged police officers in more than a dozen firefights from 
October 1967 to December 1969, and at least two policemen and as many as ten Panthers 
died in that two year period. In 1969 alone law enforcement officers arrested 348 Panthers 
on murder, armed robbery, rape, bank robbery, drug trafficking, burglary, and dozens of other 
charges.27 The steady escalation of clashes with the government led many Panthers to go 
underground or live in exile rather than face arrest and imprisonment. While underground 
some members resorted to guerilla warfare in response to governmental actions.28 Clearly, 
by 1970 the rhetoric of the Party, as it was represented in The Black Panther newspaper, had 
25Kenneth O' Reilly, Racial Matters, (New York: Free Press, 1989), 293-324. 
“Ward Churchill, Wall Churchill, and Jim Vander, Agents of Repression, (Boston: South End 
Press, 1988), 58. 
270' Reilly, 297. 
28Black Panther Party, 6 June 1970. 
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become one of advocating armed revolution in general and urban guerilla warfare as the short 
term method of struggling. 
With the pressure of repressive activities directed towards the Black Panther 
Party by governmental agencies, conflicts arose within the Party as to the most effective 
methods of utilizing armed defense and combatting the offenses of the government. Members 
such as Lumumba Shakur of the New York 21 and Geronimo Pratt of the Los Angeles 
chapter, wrote articles encouraging the Party to increase its use of armed struggle. In his 
article Shakur wrote: 
To show you what is meant by armed propaganda . . . Fidel Castro said ‘At 
the right time, one military move is more educational to the people than one 
thousand rallies.’29 
During the heightened repressive activities of governmental agencies, Party members were 
discouraged from engaging in armed activities by the Central Committee. Members who 
continued with such behavior were accused of conspiring to undermine and destroy the 
Panther Party, and were expelled or purged for their actions.30 
The disagreements within the Party surrounding the direction of armed struggle 
was culminated by the expulsion of Geronimo Pratt and members of the New York 21 in the 
winter of 1971. Newton stated the following regarding the expulsion of Pratt: 
Geronimo and the others who are hereby purged attempted to organize 
other renegades from our Party and themselves into counterrevolutionary, little 
rebel roving bands, certainly not adhering to the Party’s principles or orders. 
29Ibid„ 9 May 1970. 
“Ibid., 31 December 1970. 
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During the following months members within various branches nationally expressed their 
discontent. In Los Angeles, where Pratt had organized and educated rank and file members, 
many whom he had trained refused to accept his expulsion. The discontent within the Party 
peaked in February of 1971, when Dhoruba Moore and Michael Tabor, other members of the 
New York 21, along with European support coordinator and secretary to Huey Newton, 
Connie Matthews, were expelled from the Party.31 
Following those expulsions, the entire International Bureau, which Cleaver 
headed in Algeria while he was exiled, and the entire New York chapter of the Black Panther 
Party were expelled for questioning the direction of the Party and practice of particular 
leaders. Panthers who were expelled or split from the Oakland faction continued to refer to 
themselves as Black Panther Party members, and established a coordinating committee with 
headquarters located in Harlem, New York. Although the use of armed struggle was not the 
sole issue in the division within the Black Panther Party, it was a major one. The majority of 
those who advocated that the Party should assume a more active role in the development of 
armed struggle seceded from the Black Panther Party, headquartered in Oakland.32 
Following the split within the Party, the original Oakland group, led by Huey 
Newton and Chief of Staff David Hilliard, issued numerous statements denouncing the “ultra 
military” direction that the Party had taken over the past two years or so. In an address to 
major African American religious community leaders in May of 1971, Huey Newton stated 
31Ibid„ 13 February 1971. 
32Heath, 68. 
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that the Black Panther Party had defected from the black community and alienated itself from 
the masses of people. Newton placed most of the blame for past Party behavior and direction 
on the then Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver. He contended that Cleaver was never 
interested in grassroots community organizing but rather in the adventurous romance of using 
arms. Cleaver’s profane, bombastic rhetoric, according to Newton, made the Panthers 
vulnerable to external repression and increased the influence of those more concerned with 
displays of bravado than with community organizing.33 The Oakland faction of the Party 
began to adopt other methods of combatting governmental repression. Chairman Bobby 
Seale stated: 
We can literally vote out the existing police departments . . . Then I was 
asked, I thought you believed in guerilla warfare. But I said under the 
circumstances when the people, the masses, believe and see that guerilla warfare 
is just.34 
The factionalization of the Black Panther Party, the Oakland faction and the New 
York/Cleaver faction, caused the political and military resources of the organization to be 
divided and was clearly enhanced by covert operations of the FBI. According to O’Reilly, 
the FBI sent bogus letters to Newton and Cleaver and their respective followers to instigate 
internal fighting.35 The letters questioned Newton’s competence and Cleaver’s alleged plans 
to take over the Party with the aid of the New York chapter. A January 1971 letter, drafted 
to appear as if it was written by Newton’s personal secretary, Connie Matthews, was typical: 
“Black Panther Party, 25 May 1971. 
“Ibid., 6 April 1971. 
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Things around headquarters are dreadfully disorganized with the comrade 
commander [Newton] not making proper decisions. The newspaper is in 
shambles. No one knows who is in charge. The foreign department [Cleaver 
led] gets no support ... I fear there is a rebellion working just beneath the 
surface ... We must either get rid of the Supreme Commander [Newton] or get 
rid of the disloyal members [Cleaver and New York chapter].36 
Although both factions claimed to still adhere to the Party line of “War is politics 
with bloodshed and politics is war without bloodshed,” they began to emphasize either the 
mass organizational or military aspect of the struggle. During the period of 1971-1974, the 
armed propaganda activities of the underground attracted many members of the New York 
faction. With the escalation of armed activities the mass organizational and educational work 
suffered. Over this period the New York Black Panther Party slowly faded. The armed 
underground began to take the form of what was to become the Black Liberation Army. At 
this point, the Black Panther Party was no longer widely practicing the use of armed struggle, 
by either the Oakland or New York factions.37 
Analysis 
The political process model largely explains the role of armed defense as a tactical 
choice upon the development and outcome of the Black Panther Party. The political 
environment that existed at the time of the Panther’s development included certain ‘political 
opportunities’ of which the organization attempted to take advantage. For example, in the 




and the black community existed. Advancing upon reports of police brutality, harassment, 
and other wrongdoings, the Black Panther Party initiated the tactical choice of armed defense 
(police patrols, public display of weapons, and propaganda). The tactic was a creative 
maneuver to obtain its stated goals, most notably point number seven of the Ten Point 
program and platform: The end of police brutality within the black community. 
Shortly after the Black Panther Party’s tactical innovation of armed defense, was 
put into action, the authorities or governmental agencies responded with tactics of their own. 
The authorities utilized tactical adaptation, in attempts to neutralize the Party’s ability to 
maneuver and obtain its goals. The tactical interaction between the Panthers and the 
authorities was similar to a chess game, each party trying to thwart the moves of the other. 
The public display of arms was countered by local police harassment and repression. Police 
repression was countered by increased armed displays and propaganda by the Panthers. 
Again, attempting to neutralize the moves of the Panther organization, the Mulford bill was 
passed in 1967, which outlawed the public display of weapons and disarmed the Panthers. 
The Panthers responded with propaganda and highly publicized activities to gamer the 
support of sympathizers and the black community. This initial stance propelled the Panther 
Party into the forefront of the radical revolutionary movement. 
The authorities increased the intensity of their repressive activities towards the 
Black Panther Party, attempting to offset the Party’ growth and burgeoning national presence. 
In 1969, FBI. Director J. Edgar Hoover proclaimed that the Black Panther Party “represents 
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the greatest threat to the internal security of the country.”38 This statement foreshadowed the 
events that would occur in the political life of the Panthers. Shoot-outs between 
governmental agents and the Panthers ensued, members were killed, jailed, lived in exile, or 
forced underground. Most notably, the leadership was attacked. Huey Newton, Bobby 
Seale, and Eldridge Cleaver were jailed or exiled during critical moments of the organization’s 
political life. The internal organization of the Panther Party was greatly weakened during 
1968-1971. The reduced strength of the internal organization corresponded with the 
nationwide repression of the Party and the activities of COINTELPRO by the FBI. The 
authorities’ response towards the use and advocation of armed defense by the Black Panther 
Party was simply more effective than the tactical innovation of the Panthers. The 
government’s unyielding national presence and ability to disrupt and dismantle the Party and 
its activities proved too powerful for this challenging organization to endure. The Party 
became divided, it was isolated from the black community, and its image was severely 
tarnished. COINTELPRO had succeeded in its main objective, stymie the growth of the 
Black Panther Party in attempt to eradicate its presence in America. By 1971 the advocation 
and use of armed struggle by the Black Panther Party was no longer widely practiced. The 
tactical choice initiated by the Panthers was countered and suppressed. 
^Congress, House, Committee on Internal Security, Black Panther Party Hearing, 91st Cong., 
2nd sess., 1970. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
SURVIVAL PROGRAMS 
Another tactical choice initiated by the Black Panther Party was the development 
of “survival” programs. The internal organization of the Panthers and the political 
environment in which it existed were significant in the innovation of the programs. The 
organization was at the height of governmental repression during the birth of the survival 
programs, in 1969. The Panther Party was alienated from the black community, viewed by 
many as simply a military based terrorist organization.1 In an attempt to realign itself with the 
community and mobilize support, the Party focused upon one of the central themes of the 
organization: “serving the people.” At the time the surrounding political environment was 
vulnerable due to the established institutions’ failure to meet the basic human needs and 
desires of the people, allowing the Panthers an opportunity to address certain societal 
conditions to advance their cause and objectives. The tactical innovation of survival programs 
was an attempt to offset the increased repressive governmental activity by combating the 
negative violent image that was attached to the Party, and to accumulate community support 
to fortify the struggle against the authorities.2 The purpose of the survival programs was to 
‘Louis Heath, ed., Off the Pigs, (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1976), 48. 
2Philip S. Foner, The Black Panthers Speak, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), 160. 
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serve the people which in turn would serve the development and survival of the Panther Party. 
The major survival programs were: the free breakfast programs, the liberation schools, and 
the medical/health programs. 
Free Breakfast Program 
One of the more widely publicized and innovative Panther programs was the Free 
Breakfast Program. This program began as an attempt to address the material needs within 
the local communities in which the Black Panther Party functioned. Specifically, it was a 
response to the many children who attended school each day hungry. Each chapter of the 
Party operated at least one Free Breakfast Program. The Party through the program 
attempted to illustrate the need for nutritional assistance within the black community. 
Feeding children before they went to school also served to expose the economic inequities 
within society. 
It is not enough to write about hunger and starvation in America’s Black 
communities because Black people are basically a non-reading people. The 
Black Panther Party has taken this into account, and we have seen that it is not 
enough to publish 2,000 page reports containing facts and statistics on hunger in 
Babylon because we cannot feed a report to a hungry child. Instead, the Party 
has put its theoiy of serving the people into practice and has instituted free 
breakfast for children all across this country.3 
The first free breakfast programs began in the latter part of 1967 and early part 
of 1968. In the spring of 1969 the Black Panther Party increased its efforts, instituting the 
3Black Panther Party, The Black Panther, 28 February 1970. 
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program on a national basis, developing programs at every chapter.4 Initially, the free 
breakfast programs operated out of donated churches and community centers. The Party 
welcomed children from all ethnic backgrounds. In many programs there were European 
American children as well as Latinos, and African Americans. In New York City; Berkeley, 
California; Seattle, Washington; and Chicago, Illinois it was not unusual to find a multi¬ 
cultural population among children and staff. Elmer James Dixon, breakfast coordinator for 
the Seattle, Washington chapter stated: 
Here the hungry kids of Colman Elementary School, Black and White, are being 
fed good hot nutritious meals every morning before they attend classes.5 
At many centers there was very little formal interaction between the staff and the 
children due to the shortage of staff and the amount of meals to be served. At other centers, 
staff members conducted informal discussions or classes on history and political education. 
The basic educational tool used during meals was the Ten Point Program and Platform of the 
Black Panther Party, posters displayed on the walls and/or The Black Panther newspaper. 
The Black Panther Party did not attempt to hide the educational and organizational goals of 
the programs. At the inception of the free breakfast program, as with other Panther survival 
programs, the idea was to initiate programs and allow other organizations and individuals to 
assume control.6 Organizations such as the Puerto Rican Young Lords, Chicano Brown 
Berets, Asian I Wor Kuen, Euro-American Young Patriots not only began their own 
Toner, 160. 
5Black Panther Party, 15 November 1969. 
6Congress, House, Committee on Internal Security, Black Panther Party Hearing, 91st Cong., 
2nd sess., 1970. 
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independent free breakfast programs but also worked with local Black Panther Party chapters 
in joint operation. In New York city the Panthers and the Young Lords worked together in 
a number of breakfast programs in black and Latino neighborhoods. Also, on the Lower 
Eastside of Manhattan, the Panthers and a Euro-American community organization 
collaborated to develop a breakfast program.7 
The authorities responded to the free breakfast program by attempting to 
sabotage and discredit the Party’s work. A major objective of the FBI was to create a climate 
that suggested that the Party was teaching children to hate and kill white people, especially 
police.8 O’Reilly has documented evidence suggesting that the FBI and other local law 
enforcement agencies disseminated rumors, distributed false documents, and intimidated 
community supporters. For example, in Detroit, Michigan, the local FBI distributed forged 
letters threatening local businessmen if they did not donate to the Panther Party programs.9 
In San Francisco the free breakfast program was disrupted by rumors spread by the FBI that 
various personnel in the national headquarters of the Panther Party were infected with 
venereal diseases.10 Also, in San Diego FBI officials pressured the Catholic archdiocese and 
eventually the priest who helped the Panthers house the free breakfast program was 
transferred to “somewhere in the State of New Mexico.”11 Statements from the 
7Claybome Carson, ed., The Movement 1964-1970, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 
562-564. 





COINTELPRO department to the San Francisco’s FBI branch, regarding the targeting of free 
breakfast programs, summarizes the government’s political motive for the attacks: 
Your reasoning is not in line with Bureau objectives . . . You state that the 
Bureau .. . should not attack programs of community interest such as the B.P.P. 
‘Breakfast for Children.’ You state that this is because many 
prominent‘humanitarians,’both white and black, are interested in the program as 
well as churches which are actively supporting it. You have obviously missed the 
point. The B.P.P. is not engaged in the ‘Breakfast for Children’ program for 
humanitarian reasons, including their efforts to create an image of civility, assume 
community control of Negroes, and to fill adolescent children with their insidious 
poison.12 
Due to the campaign by various governmental agencies to discredit the free 
breakfast program the Party decided that the education of children had to be done in a 
completely separate program. The campaign by the authorities had caused some supporters 
of the free breakfast program and portions of the black community to become wary of the 
actual workings of the program. Party leaders understood that to engage in extensive 
educational activities in the breakfast program would only provide more ammunition to those 
who were attempting to discredit its value.13 
Liberation Schools 
During 1969, using the free breakfast program as a model the Party instituted 
other survival programs. One of the first of such programs was the Liberation Schools. The 




programs. The basic mandate for this program was point number five of the Ten Point 
Program and Platform: 
We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of the 
decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history 
and our role in the present-day society.14 
The initial liberation classes were relatively modest, similar to political education 
classes the Party held for its rank and file members. The curriculum consisted of the Ten 
Point Program and Platform of the Black Panther Party, news articles on local events from 
The Black Panther, and the learning and singing of songs. One of the major topics of 
discussion in the liberation school classes was the treatment of the Panthers by the 
government, as well as the role of governmental institutions within the black community. The 
Black Panther Party’s interpretation of the roles of the police, schools, hospitals, landlords 
and store owners was discussed and related to specific events surrounding and involving the 
Party or the local community.15 
Although the particular issues or subject matter varied from program to program, 
the underlying goal of the youth educational programs of the Party was to establish what the 
Panthers considered “revolutionary principles.” Discipline, respect and love for black people 
were strongly emphasized, as was service to the community. As with its other community 
programs the Party regarded the role of its youth education program as developing the 
foundation for independent people’s institutions.16 
,4Ibid„ 2. 
,5Black Panther Party, 15 November 1969. 
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In Harlem, New York the Party held liberation classes during the spring and 
summer of 1969. Many of these classes were held by young community workers and 
Panthers in training. The subject of the classes centered around the Ten Point Program and 
Platform and how it related to conditions within the Harlem community. The Harlem classes, 
like many throughout the country, were very informal. Many classes were held directly 
outside storefront offices, while others were conducted in local parks. Children usually sang 
songs that reflected the Party’s political message or viewed films which documented the 
African American struggle. In some areas the local Panthers provided snacks and held 
recreational activities. One of the more popular activities of these classes was the close-order 
drills. The children would watch rank and file Party members practice drills in local parks and 
would often emulate the older Panthers, marching through the street, chanting Party slogans.17 
By the fall of 1969 the Black Panther Party began to develop more formalized 
liberation schools.18 The liberation schools were much more formal than the liberation 
classes. Many of the liberation schools were in session for about three to four hours once a 
week during the school year and full time during the summer. A number of schools also 
provided meals. The curriculum at most liberation schools included basic academic skills as 
well as political and historical education. According to O’Reilly, the authorities’ response to 
the liberation schools consisted of propaganda claiming the schools were designed to 
indoctrinate children into hatred and violence towards whites and the police. For example, 
l7Black Panther Party, 15 November 1969. 
"Toner, 170-172. 
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the FBI seized a Panther coloring book (which was previously rejected by Party leaders) and 
added violent captions before disseminating the book throughout various communities.19 
In 1970, the Black Panther Party established a full-time school in Oakland, 
California. Initially it was called “The Huey P. Newton Institute” but the name was eventually 
changed to “The Oakland Community School.” Between 1971 and 1975 the school was 
incorporated and operated separately from the Party. The Oakland Community School 
outlived the Black Panther Party, ironically receiving government funding and accreditation. 
The school was widely publicized during the mid to late 1970’s, as a model for community 
controlled alternative educational institutions.20 
Medical Health Programs 
One of the more successful survival programs developed by the Black Panther 
Party was its medical/health program. The Party initiated the program in the early part of 
1969. Various chapters of the Party began working with health professionals and medical 
students conducting routine medical examinations in the local communities. Conditions and 
problems such as high blood pressure, sickle cell anemia, lead poisoning, and drug abuse were 
some of the major concerns of the initial medical programs. Blood and blood-pressure 
testing, nutritional counseling, general examinations, and drug counseling were some of the 
services provided by the first Panther medical teams. Most of the Panthers who worked in 
l90’Reilly, 302. 
“Black Panther Party, 8 January 1972. 
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these medical teams were trained by medical volunteers who were either medical students or 
professional nurses and physicians. At first Party members concentrated on acquiring first aid 
skills. To acquire the proper skills many chapters held first aid classes among the rank and 
file. The first medical cadres of the Party were also responsible for the medical needs of the 
rank and file members.21 
The following is an excerpt from Harlem Panther Assata Shakur concerning her 
involvement in the New York chapter medical cadre. 
The medical cadre was responsible for the health care of the Panthers. We 
made medical and dental appointments for them and taught them basic first aid 
so that they could help the people in emergencies. We also set up tables on the 
street corners and gave free TB tests or gave out information on sickle cell 
anemia. It was also my job to work with the Black medical students and doctors 
who we were counting on to help us set up a free clinic in Harlem. Every week 
all the medical cadre members from the Bronx, Brooklyn, Harlem, Jamaica, and 
Corona Branches met at the Bronx Ministry of Information . . . The head of the 
medical cadre was Alaywa, and from the first moment she gained my respect and 
admiration. She was serious about everything that concerned lack people, when 
it came to their health she was a fanatic.22 
Although the Harlem branch never did establish a free health clinic, Panthers did work with 
European American and Puerto Rican medical teams in a clinic on the Lower Eastside of 
Manhattan. In Brooklyn, New York there was the New York 21 Community Health Clinic. 
Aside from physical examinations, various tests and basic medical treatment, the clinic 
focused upon health education and preventive medicine. In Portland, Oregon the Black 
21Black Panther Party, 28 February 1969. 
22Assata Shakur, Assata: An Autobiography, (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 
1987), 217. 
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Panther Party established The People’s Health Clinic which was open five days a week for 
three hours a day.23 
One of the more successful clinics operated in Chicago. In January of 1970 the 
Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party opened the Surgeon Jake Winter’s People’s 
Medical Care Center. The clinic served over 2,000 people within the first two months of its 
existence. The center was staffed by gynecologists, obstetricians, dentists, pediatricians, 
optometrists, general practitioners, R.N.’s, lab-technicians, and public advocates. The Party 
held weekly informational meetings for the public. They also organized community 
volunteers and medical students to canvass the community, testing for lead poisoning, sickle 
cell anemia, and diabetes. According to Sheffield, the clinic was staffed by qualified medical 
staff and had adequate equipment, but the city health authorities repeatedly attempted to stop 
its operations. In addition to difficulties with local authorities, the clinic was also subjected 
to various break-ins in which nothing was taken but equipment was vandalized. On one 
occasion shots were fired into the clinic.24 
The Surgeon Jake Winter’s People Medical Care Center was named after an 
Illinois chapter member who was shot and killed by Chicago police on November 13, 1969.25 
The clinic consisted of Party members, other skilled people, and the general community 
working together to operate it. Through their work with progressive students and medical 
professionals the Party was able to utilize their advanced skills on a grassroots community 
23Black Panther Party, 28 February 1969. 
24Lincoln W. Sheffield, “People’s Medical Care Center,” Daily World, 17 January 1970. 
25Ibid. 
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level. The Party facilitated the process of medical skills and services into the black and other 
poor communities. The health clinic also involved community people as participants in the 
maintenance of the program. By encouraging the community to participate, the Party 
believed it could provide medical care to the community while also training community people 
in public health.26 
Another successful clinic which drew large community participation was the 
People’s Free Health Clinic started by the Massachusetts chapter of the Black Panther Party. 
Opened in May of 1970, the clinic was housed in a trailer. In addition to holding public health 
classes, the Boston center also trained lab technicians, nursing assistants, and medical 
secretaries. One of the motivating incidents which propelled the establishment of the Boston 
People’s Health Clinic was the shooting death of an African American patient by police at 
Boston General Hospital. The Party utilized the incident to mobilize support for its clinic and 
community control of medical care, in general, particularly in the Boston area.27 
During 1971 the Black Panther Party launched a national campaign to raise the 
public consciousness on the issue of sickle cell anemia. In addition to its national testing 
campaign enacted in 1970, the Party was a leading participant among other organizations in 
the establishment of a research foundation dedicated to combating sickle cell anemia.28 
Another aspect of the Black Panther Party’s work concerning health care consisted of articles 
and reports in The Black Panther newspaper. The articles reported on proper diets, histoiy 
26Heath, 85. 
27Black Panther Party, 12 June 1971. 
28Black Panther Party, 8 January 1972. 
67 
and symptoms of specific diseases, and analysis of the health industry in the United States. 
The Party’s newspaper also reported on the substandard medical services provided in black 
and other poor communities. 
Analysis 
The tactical choice of implementing survival programs by the Black Panther Party 
was a critical maneuver in attempts to hinder the force of governmental attacks and 
strengthen the organization’s standing in the community. The political environment in which 
the Black Panther Party existed consisted of severe governmental repression and the belief 
that the basic human needs and desires of the black community were not being fully met. This 
political context allowed the Panthers an opportunity to attempt to invigorate the organization 
and mobilize support for its objectives. 
In the process of establishing survival or community programs, the Panther Party 
found it difficult to focus its efforts due to the increasing governmental attacks. The Party 
was literally forced to focus its attention upon its survival. As mentioned earlier, the free 
breakfast programs, liberation schools, and medical/health programs suffered from the FBI’s 
attempts of sabotage. Propaganda was spread by the governmental agencies attempting to 
thwart the moves of the Party, forged letters were distributed under the disguise that the 
Panthers had written the documents, and Party supporters were harassed.29 Governmental 
tactics were effective in combatting the maneuvers of the Panther Party. 
290’Reilly, 302-316. 
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The survival programs were successful in meeting some basic human needs of the 
community. Children were fed nutritional meals, both children and adults were educated, and 
many were afforded health care. However, as the Party was attacked the programs suffered. 
“The Oakland Community School” was able to survive because it soon was able to function 
as a community operated school, separate from the Black Panther Party. Survival programs 
which other organizations and groups were able to assume control over found greater success 
in their ability to maintain operation. The Panther Party was considered “the greatest threat 
to internal security,” by governmental agencies and this included all programs associated with 
the Party, no matter how much of a humanitarian effort it was.30 Basically, the Black Panther 
Party was unable to develop the long term community institutions it desired, therefore, the 
Party was unable to access certain institutionalized privileges and large community support 




The Black Panther Party held working relations with other challenging groups 
throughout its history. The tactical choice of working coalitions was developed to increase 
resources and provide a united front against the established authorities. The Panther Party, 
since its beginning, had always focused upon the need for alliances with other communities 
or third world colonies.1 The political environment at the time that the coalitions were 
formed, consisted of a view that the United States was no longer a nation, but an empire, an 
empire that had transformed other nations or countries into oppressed communities or third 
world colonies. The Panthers held the belief that to fight the rise of imperialism they must 
fight as a united front, one common goal and one common enemy. The enemy was the United 
States and the goal was the destruction of the United States capitalist empire. The Panther 
Party as a challenging organization was aware that its survival was closely linked with the 
support of and alliance with other challenging communities, colonies, organizations, and 
groups.2 
'Huey P. Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, (New York: Writers and Publishing, 1995), 68. 
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One of the Party ' s earliest efforts at building coalitions was the proposed drafting 
of three SNCC leaders into the Black Panther Party. In the early stages of the Party ' s 
campaign to free Huey Newton, Bobby Seale and Eldridge Cleaver made numerous trips to 
Southern California and Washington, D.C. to confer with SNCC leaders James Forman and 
Stokely Carmichael. Both Seale and Cleaver felt that these individuals would provide the 
needed publicity on the plight of Huey Newton. The Black Panther Party wanted to enlist 
SNCC in a working alliance around the freedom of Newton.3 In particular, the Party was 
interested in developing a working relation with Carmichael, who at that time was one of the 
leading Black Power advocates. Impressed with their discussions with Carmichael, Seale and 
Cleaver decided to propose to draft the three top figures in SNCC, Forman, Carmichael, and 
H. Rap Brown onto the Black Panther Party Central Committee.4 
On February 17, 1968, the Black Panther Party held a rally at the Oakland 
Auditorium for jailed Panther leader Huey Newton in which one thousand people attended 
and 10,000 dollars was raised. At this rally SNCC leaders Carmichael, Forman, and Brown 
spoke. Each pledged support to both Newton ' s freedom and to the program of the Black 
Panther Party. Following the speeches by the SNCC leaders, Cleaver announced a 
Panther/SNCC alliance. The only details other than statements of support and unity given at 
this rally was the drafting of Carmichael, Forman, and Brown onto the Central Committee of 
3Claybome Carson, In Struggle, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1981), 279. 
4Robert Allen, Black Awakening in Capitalist America, (Garden City, New York: Anchor 
Books, 1970), 266-267. 
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the Party. Carmichael was appointed Prime Minister, Forman, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and Brown was named Minister of Justice.5 
Following the February 1968 rally and draft, there is little evidence of mutual 
work done, besides SNCC sponsored events held in the Oakland Bay area. Within a year of 
the February 1968 rally, the names of the drafted SNNC leaders were dropped from the 
published list of Black Panther Party leaders.6 The efforts of Carmichael and other SNCC 
activists to separate themselves from white allies adversely affected their relations with the 
Panthers, who openly welcomed white support. Carmichael advocated racial unity rather than 
interracial coalitions and would later state that the Panthers “didn ' t understand anything 
about organizing” and “camouflaged” their lack of organized strength through their 
cultivation of white leftist support.7 The Panther ' s recognition that they were under deadly 
attack from governmental agencies made them distrustful of and impatient with black activists 
who questioned their ideological orientation. In 1970, both Eldridge Cleaver and Huey 
Newton held a press conference charging Carmichael with being a C.I.A. agent, on the basis 
of the above mentioned public statements and others that Carmichael had made regarding the 
Black Panther Party.8 In an open letter to Carmichael, Cleaver discusses the conflict: 
Your letter of resignation as the Prime Minister of the Black Panther Party 
came, I think, about one year too late. As a matter of fact, since the day of your 
5Black Panther Party, The Black Panther, 16 March 1968. 
6Carson, 284. 
7Carson, 280. 
8Black Panther Party, 5 September 1970. 
72 
appointment to that position-February 17, 1968-events have proven that you 
were not cut out for the job in the first place. Even then it was clear that your 
position on coalition with revolutionary white organizations was in conflict with 
that of the Black Panther Party. But we thought that, in time, even you would 
be able to shake the SNCC paranoia about white control and get on with the 
business of building the type of revolutionary machinery that we need in the 
United States in order to unite all the revolutionary forces in the country to 
overthrow the system of Capitalism, Imperialism and Racism.9 
The covert operations of the FBI enhanced the already difficult and distrustful 
Panther/SNCC alliance. As mentioned above, the FBI ' s COINTELPRO was intended to 
forestall “a coalition of militant Black nationalist groups.”10 According to O ' Reilly, the FBI 
created fictitious SNCC members to call and harass Panther members. Carmichael ' s mother 
received a phone call from an FBI agent warning of an alleged Panther assassination plot 
against her son. The entire plot was fabricated by the FBI. Also, the FBI considered labeling 
Carmichael a government informant to ensure that an alliance would not be formed.11 
Another coalition established was the alliance with the European American, San 
Francisco based Peace and Freedom Party (PFP). The basis of this working relationship was 
a pledge that the PFP would provide needed resources for the Black Panther Party ' s 
campaign to Free Huey, and that the PFP would also support Panther leaders in local and 
national elections. For their part the Panthers were to assist the PFP in voter-registration 
drives in the black communities of the Bay area. The Panther/PFP alliance produced far more 
9Foner, 104. 
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material benefits for the Party than did the Panther/SNCC alliance. In fact, the major basis 
of this alliance was the material aid and publicity apparatus placed at the disposal of the 
Panthers. The Panthers were given sound trucks, sound equipment for rallies, enhanced 
duplicating capacity for posters and flyers, as well as funds for Newton ' s legal defense. The 
PFP also sponsored the 1968 presidential campaign of the Minister of Information, Eldridge 
Cleaver.12 The Cleaver presidential campaign was a very important endeavor for the 
transformation of the Black Panther Party from a local/statewide organization into a national 
one. With the funds supplied by the Peace and Freedom Party, Cleaver, and the Panther Party 
were able to travel the country. 
The Cleaver presidential campaign was viewed by the Panthers solely as a way 
to gather support and organize on a national level. In that respect it was a tremendous help 
to the growth of the Black Panther Party. The role of the PFP in the coalition was less of a 
partner and more of a support apparatus for the Panthers. The members of the PFP worked 
in the European American communities campaigning and registering voters, while the 
Panthers continued their organizing in the black communities.13 
The above mentioned efforts to work with other organizations operated to the 
advantage of the Panthers. The coalitions allowed the Party to gain publicity and support 
outside the San Francisco/Oakland Bay area. In the case of the SNCC alliance, there was 
never an actual working arrangement. The only benefit was one of public relations, since the 
12Sanjukta Banejj, Black Power and Radicalism, (New York: Advent Books, Inc., 1987), 142. 
l3Louis Heath, Off the Pigs, (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1976), 125. 
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SNCC leaders were better known on the national level. In the PFP coalition the Panthers 
added material resources to their efforts at local organizing and national growth.14 
By the summer of 1969 the Black Panther Party was a national organization with 
over 32 chapters throughout the United States.15 The Party had established working relations 
with a few local and regional organizations. Many of these organizations were similar to the 
Black Panther Party in program, ideology, appearance, and mode of operation. Of the 
various organizations which held working relations with the Party, four are most notable; The 
Brown Berets, The Young Lords, I Wor Kuen, and the Young Patriots. Although patterned 
after the Panthers, these organizations maintained an autonomous leadership and pursued 
their own agendas. One of the primary factors in the success of these alliances was the 
Panther's belief that each “domestic third world colony” should organize in its own 
community. This allowed the Party to work with Mexican Americans, Asian Americans, and 
Puerto Ricans, as well as poor European American organizations with a limited amount of 
competition.16 
One of the first third world organizations to establish an alliance with the Black 
Panther Party was the Mexican American Brown Berets of Southern California. The 
Southern California chapter of the Panthers and the Brown Berets supported each others1 
work. Each organization participated in various events of the other. The Black Panther Party 
14Ibid., 126. 
l5Black Panther Party, 3 June 1969. 
16Robert Weisbrot, Freedom Bound, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1990), 252-253. 
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in summer of 1969 printed part of its newspaper in Spanish and printed articles which dealt 
with organizing efforts in the Latin American communities of Southern California.17 
Another organization which allied with the Panthers was the Young Lords 
Organization, which was founded in 1969, in Chicago, Illinois. The Chicago chapter of the 
Panthers worked with the Young Lords in eliminating gang violence and in joint programs 
such as the Surgeon Jake Winter's People's Medical Care Center and free breakfast 
programs. In New York the local chapter of the Panthers also worked with the Young Lords 
organization which also held a chapter in New York. The Harlem branch of the Black 
Panther Party had strong working relations with the chapter of Young Lords in New York. 
Aside from mutual assistance of each others ' programs such as medical clinics, free breakfast 
programs, and clothing distribution, each group came to the assistance of the other in times 
of governmental attacks. The Young Lords did extensive propaganda work in the Puerto 
Rican neighborhoods around the issue of the arrest of the New York 21. The Lords also sent 
members to the courthouse during demonstrations. When a member of the Young Lords was 
arrested and found hanged in his jail cell, the New York chapter of the Panthers mobilized its 
members and supporters to assist the Lords in a protest action. Both organizations also 
served on numerous multi-organizational efforts such as citywide housing and student 
coalitions.18 
17Black Panther Party, 16 August 1969. 
18Ibid., 26 December 1970. 
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Another, less active coalition was with a Chinese-American organization I Wor 
Kuen and The Red Guard. As with the Young Lords, I Wor Kuen and The Red Guard 
focused their organizing efforts within the working class communities. Their primary target 
areas were the Chinatowns of New York City, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. One of the 
unifying factors between these two organizations and the Black Panther Party was their 
adherence to the teachings of Chinese leader Mao Tse Tung. Also, like the Panthers, they 
believed that Asian Americans were a national minority who suffered oppression and 
constituted a domestic third world colony. The Panthers and The Red Guard participated in 
joint activities similar to those shared with the Young Lords. One interesting aspect of this 
working relation was that it removed some social barriers between the African American 
community and the Asian American community. For both the Panthers, and The Red Guard 
and I Wor Kuen, the alliance served for many members their first serious contact with the 
others' community.19 
One of the European American organizations which had organizing relations with 
the Panther Party was the Young Patriot Party. Founded in white working-class 
neighborhoods of Chicago, the Young Patriots were an anti-racist, pro-socialist organization. 
In New York city, the Young Patriots organized on the upper eastside of Manhattan which 
had been a traditional German American working class neighborhood. Unlike the West coast 
Peace and Freedom Party, the Young Patriots were not middle class students or counter 
culture types. The Patriots claimed to be from the true poor and working class culture of 
213-215. 
19Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage, (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), 
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Appalachia. Rather than organize among students and progressive European Americans, they 
attempted to work in areas where African Americans and other third world peoples would not 
be welcomed.20 
The Black Panther Party held working relations with the above-mentioned 
organizations before the summer of 1969. The relations were loose and unstructured; there 
was no official platform which united the various organizations. During the spring of 1969, 
the Panthers organized a conference which was designed to bring together all the progressive 
militant organizations. During the conference, workshops were held at which various issues 
and views were discussed. The objective of the conference was to develop a united front to 
fight fascism.21 
At the National Front Against Fascism conference the Black Panther Party was 
clearly the largest and most dynamic of all the participating organizations. Of the progressive 
European American organizations participating in the conference, most recognized the 
Panther Party as the leading “revolutionary” organization in the United States. A few months 
earlier the Students for a Democratic Society had publicly recognized the Panthers as the 
vanguard party in the United States revolutionary struggle.22 The Peace and Freedom Party 
and the Young Patriots had already proclaimed their endorsement of the Panther Party1 s 
platform and programs. 
20Foner, 239. 
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Of the Third World organizations participating, most had already demonstrated 
their active support of the Panther program. The Young Lords, Brown Berets, I Wor Kuen, 
and The Red Guard, leading groups at the conference, all had programs and platforms similar 
to the Panthers. With the exception of many small communist oriented European American 
groups, a few small African American nationalist organizations, and local student groups, the 
majority of people in attendance already supported the programs and platform of the Black 
Panther Party. The fact that 4,000 people attended the conference can be attributed to the 
level of individual and organizational support of the the Black Panther Party and its allies. 
The conference failed to attract the many organizations who were not already participating 
in Panther Party type activities.23 In the sense of developing a broad united front, the 
conference was not successful in drawing together various factions and elements. What the 
conference did accomplish was the consolidation of Panther support and the strengthening 
of ties which already existed among various organizations. 
Following the United Front Against Fascism Conference, the Black Panther Party 
went on to form the National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF). This committee was 
formed to continue the unity developed from the conference. Since the conference was a 
reaffirmation of established Party support, the NCCF developed into a quasi-Panther affiliate. 
The NCCF offices served as organizing agents of the Black Panther Party.24 In fact, since the 




chapters. Most new Party facilities following 1969, were NCCF offices. There were not any 
separate NCCF leadership, rules, philosophy, or directives. Persons working in NCCF offices 
operated under the leadership of the Panther Party and focused upon Panther work. Members 
of the Panthers often worked in NCCF offices and usually were in leadership roles. In a 
sense, the NCCF branches became the organizational rank and file of the Black Panther Party. 
For the most part the only difference between an NCCF office and a Black Panther Party 
office was that the NCCF office was established following the 1969 purge.25 
A year after the National Front Against Fascism conference, the Black Panther 
Party again attempted to hold a national conference which would represent the desires and 
views of the entire militant radical movement in the United States. In connection with this 
effort the conference was formed to undertake the rewriting of the United States Constitution. 
The concept of the Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention was far less ambitious 
than the united front because this time the Party was not calling for a long term commitment. 
The Constitutional Convention was to take place in two stages. First, there was a preliminary 
session. At this planning session various organizations and interests were to develop the 
issues/workshops to be conducted during the actual convention. A few months later the 
members and organizations who participated in the planning sessions were to reconvene and 
draft a new people ' s constitution.26 
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The preliminary session was held over the weekend of September 4-6, 1970 at 
Temple University, in Philadelphia. Between 15,000 to 20,000 people attended including 
many organizations and individuals from European American women's liberation 
organizations as well as African American separatist nationalists. Some of the issues 
discussed were a separate nation for African Americans, cultural liberation, gay and lesbian 
rights, welfare rights, housing, drug abuses, world peace, and Vietnam veterans. Many 
grassroots organizers attended the first session in Philadelphia. Also present were 
representatives from African liberation movements, the Palestinian struggle, Germany, 
Colombia, and Brazil. The broad range of issues on the agenda and the fact that Huey 
Newton had been released from prison less than two months earlier heavily contributed to the 
great diversity of the participants.27 
The strength of the planning session of the Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional 
Convention was the large participation. Many organizations sent representatives to present 
various proposals which were discussed, debated, and refined. Each workshop was to submit 
a proposal which in turn was to be presented at the Constitutional Convention in November 
1970. The general body of the Convention voted to hold the next session in Washington DC. 
The positive aspect of the Constitutional Convention was that in the process, Panthers 
brought together many of the concerns and interests of the disenfranchised. The various 
groups and organizations had an opportunity not only to meet and converse with one another 
but also to draw connections between their particular concerns or predicaments. The 
planning session did encounter a few difficulties most of which can be attributed to actions 
27Ibid. 
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on the part of the government.2* A few days prior to the opening of the convention, on 
September 2, 1970, the Philadelphia police department raided three facilities of the host 
chapter. Fourteen Black Panther Party members were arrested on charges of illegal 
possession of weapons. In the process of arresting the Panthers the police ransacked the 
facilities, breaking windows, destroying furniture and a heating boiler, as well as taking all 
office equipment and 1,500 dollars in cash.29 In spite of the raids, by the end of the plenary 
session the Black Panther Party seemed to be well on the way towards meeting its goal of 
producing a document which expressed the mass disenchantment of oppressed peoples in the 
United States. 
The final session held in November of 1970, in Washington, D C., was less 
successful. There were fewer people who attended and a significant amount of disagreement 
during the meetings occurred due to ideological differences. The major disruption, however 
was the fact that on the opening day of the session the host facility, Howard University, 
rescinded its agreement to house the participants. This situation left the Party scrambling to 
provide housing and other facilities. The weekend conference turned out to be full of 
confusion and disagreements. Without secure workshop locations many people were unable 
to continue the work from the previous workshops. Many Party members believed that much 
of the difficulties encountered in securing space for the DC. session were due to pressure put 
“Churchill, Churchill, and Vander, 42. 
29Black Panther Party, 5 September 1970. 
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on by the FBI.30 Although there was no definite proof to these allegations, much of the 
evidence uncovered since confirms that this was consistent with the method of operation of 
the FBI. The FBI and local police agencies made it a practice to visit landlords of dwellings 
rented or prospectively rented by militant organizations such as the Black Panther Party. 
Even the House Committee on Internal Security interviewed and subpoenaed church officials 
who opened their facilities to the Panther Party.31 
Analysis 
The tactical choice of working coalitions was initiated to increase resources and 
provide a united front against the authorities. The Black Panther Party objective was to 
utilize support and other valuable resources gained through the formation of coalitions to 
obtain its goals. The political environment which existed at the time consisted of various 
groups militantly challenging the legitimacy and authority of established institutions within the 
United States. African Americans, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Native Americans, 
Asian Americans, European Americans, all were demanding justice and change within their 
communities. The organizations (Brown Berets, the Young Lords, I Wor Kuen, the Young 
Patriots, etc.) formed within these communities were representative of this political 
environment. The Black Panther Party was conscious of the need to form a united front to 
effectively challenge the establishment. 
30Ibid., 28 November 1970. 
3lO’Reilly, 316. 
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The Black Panther Party was successful in forming some effective alliances during 
its political life which aided its development. The Peace and Freedom Party alliance provided 
material resources and helped to publicize the work of the Panthers. Alliances with 
organizations such as the Brown Berets, the Young Lords, I Wor Kuen, and the Young 
Patriots were useful in the dissemination and support of Panther programs and activities. 
These coalitions along with the United Front Against Fascism and the Revolutionary Peoples 
Constitutional Convention were significant in the advancement of the Black Panther Party as 
the leading organization in the radical revolutionary movement.32 The Party was able to get 
support from organizations and communities across the country. 
Not surprisingly, as the national presence of the Black Panther Party grew, the 
repressive activities of governmental agencies also grew. The governmental attacks lessened 
the ability of the Panther Party to sustain working coalitions and produce a united front, 
especially with other black militant groups (SNCC). The Party was weakened and its 
members were forced to concentrate upon avoiding death, jail, and harassment. The Party 
was not fully prepared to resist the governmental attacks targeted towards the organization. 
As the governmental campaign intensified during 1968-1971, coalitions became more difficult 
to form and maintain continuous working relations. The tactical choice of coalitions held 
some promise, but could not be fully advanced due to the repression of the Party by 
authorities. 
“Manning Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion, (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the role of tactical choices in the 
development and outcome of a social movement organization. The political process literature 
suggested that tactical choices were significant in contributing to the success or failure of 
social movements. Utilizing the political process model as this work ' s major theoretical 
framework, the tactical choices of a challenging movement organization were examined to 
analyze their influence in an organization1 s ability to obtain its goals. The following three 
tactics of the Black Panther Party were the focus of this research: the advocacy and use of 
armed self-defense; the creation of survival programs; and the formation of coalitions with 
other challenging groups. 
The Black Panther Party before it had even established its major organizational 
structure (Central Committee, 1968) was the focus of huge media attention and severe 
governmental repression. The use of armed defense lured the media while it challenged the 
status quo, both causing great alarm for the authorities. As the authorities responded with 
various repressive tactics, the Black Panther Party became alienated from the black 
community, members were killed or imprisoned, and the organization became internally 
divided and weakened. The attacks by the government might have been cushioned and the 
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goals of the Black Panther Party might have been attained if the Black Panther Party would 
have had greater opportunity and time to facilitate the necessary support of the community. 
In an attempt to realign itself with the black community and thwart the actions 
of the authorities, the Black Panther Party developed survival programs. The survival 
programs were somewhat successful because they did serve the needs of the community but 
they were implemented too late to serve its main objective of gaining enough community 
support to combat the unyielding repressive governmental actions. At about the time the 
survival programs were initiated in 1968, the covert and overt operations of the established 
authorities were at their peak. The campaign of the government to discredit and exterminate 
the Black Panther Party was fully established, making it extremely difficult for the Party to 
effectively respond. The survival programs simply were not sufficient enough in producing 
the support of the masses needed for the Black Panther Party to fight the authorities and 
obtain its goals. 
Also, the Black Panther Party attempted to gamer support by developing working 
coalitions and alliances with other challenging groups. Such a maneuver seems relatively 
clever, but one major flaw existed. The coalitions and alliances formed by the Panther Party 
were with other organizations which also did not have the overwhelming support of their 
communities. Combining the efforts of two or more community isolated groups did not serve 
the main mission of the coalitions, thus the Black Panther Party did not greatly increase its 
support by the masses. Again, the Black Panther Party ' s inability to establish a strong 
supportive relationship with the community and the masses harshly affected its ability to 
obtain its goals. 
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The findings of this research have general ramifications as to the understanding 
of challenging movement organizations ' chances of success. The findings point to the grave 
importance of large community support in a challenging organization ' s attempt at effectively 
obtaining its objectives, especially in terms of an organization which directly attacks the status 
quo. If a challenging movement organization is determined to attain its goals it must have the 
support of the masses to protect its vulnerabilities from external attacks and internal schisms. 
Tactical choices regardless of their well-advised intentions or well thought out plans are 
virtually irrelevant in the absence of mass support. This study has shown that movements 
which attempt to achieve a desired situation will probably be more likely to succeed if it first 
establishes the critically necessary support. 
Although the Black Panther Party was unsuccessful in obtaining all its goals its 
very existence produced social change. Any movement which affects the climate of its 
environment produces some form of social change. The legacy of the Panther Party was in 
its ability to affect its environment, therefore creating change. In actual physical terms, as 
JoNina Abron has pointed out, the Black Panther Party was highly instrumental in drawing 
attention to the necessity for social programs within poor communities.1 According to Abron, 
the free breakfast program was the single most influential program, and served as a model for 
the United States Department of Agriculture's school nutritional program. Also, the 
community health clinics and health cadres were an innovation which have since been taken 
35. 
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on by the government.2 The success of these programs forced the government to adopt 
similar programs in attempts to legitimize its operations in respect to the public and erode the 
support of the Panthers. 
The Black Panther Party was also instrumental in the slight change in 
police/community relations within oppressed communities. The Panther Party politicized 
police conduct, bringing the issue to the forefront. According to Abron, these actions 
influenced the establishment of community review boards and helped to increase the diversity 
of representation on urban police forces, since the 1960's.3 In more abstract terms, the 
Panther legacy may have made its greatest contribution through its concrete examples of how 
to address the needs and desires of one ' s community. The experience gained through the 
Party ' s endeavors presents many positive lessons for future organizing efforts. This is 
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